Freie Universität Berlin

The Role of Germany and Europe in the Maintenance of Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Date: 2 December 2017
Time: 9am to 6pm
Venue: Harnack-Haus, Ihnestr. 16-20, 14195 Berlin

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Introducing the *Berlin Forum on Korea and Northeast Asia*

The *Berlin Forum on Korea and Northeast Asia* initiated, organized, and hosted by the Institute of Korean Studies (IKS) at Freie Universität Berlin is a platform for debate and deliberation among professionals and stakeholders concerned with Korea in the fields of academia, politics, the diplomatic service, the economy, and the cultural sector.

Conceptualized as a series of conferences, workshops, and individual talks, it aims to take full advantage of both Berlin's favourable geographic position at the heart of Europe and Germany's advantageous strategic position within the international community. As the capital of a country enjoying friendly relations with both Koreas and all other Northeast Asian countries that is, in particular, not engaged in any territorial or historical disputes with nations from this region, Berlin promises to provide a "neutral meeting ground" and thus an ideal venue for hosting a dialogue forum on Korea-related issues in their Northeast Asian context.

At the heart of the *Berlin Forum on Korea and Northeast Asia* is an annual conference bringing together stakeholders from the fields of politics, the diplomatic service, the economy, and the cultural sector with prominent scholars and observers to debate both long-standing issues regarding Korea and Northeast Asia and more contemporary challenges affecting the region. The series of annual conferences will be complemented by interspersing smaller workshops, while individual speakers, ranging from prominent Korean Studies specialists to diplomats, politicians, and other high-ranking officials, will be invited to Berlin to address a broader public on various Korea-related issues.

By hosting such a forum, the Institute of Korean Studies at Freie Universität Berlin hopes to establish a distinct institutional mechanism for examining Korea and Northeast Asia from the unique vantage point of the German capital, the city of Berlin.

The Role of Germany and Europe in the Maintenance of Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Date: 2 December 2017, 9am to 6pm
Venue: Harnack-Haus, Ihnestr. 16-20, 14195 Berlin

9:00 Registration

9:30 Welcome Address
Prof. Dr. Eun-Jeung Lee, Director of the Institute of Korean Studies, Freie Universität Berlin

9:40 Keynote Speech
Prof. Dr. Moon Chung-in, Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Korea for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Distinguished Professor, Yonsei University,

10:20 Coffee Break

10:30 **Panel I: The Role(s) of Germany in East Asia**

Discussants:
Prof. Dr. Volker Deville, Bayreuth University, Governance and International Management. Founding Director of F/L Think Tank, dealing with future studies
Jürgen Klimke, former Member of the German Federal Parliament (CDU), CEO Industrie-Contact AG
Dr. Norbert Baas, former Ambassador of Germany to the Republic of Korea
Michael Geier, former Ambassador of Germany to the Republic of Korea
Dr. Hans-Ulrich Seidt, former Ambassador of Germany to the Republic of Korea

Moderator: **Jun.-Prof. Dr. Hannes B. Mosler**, Graduate School of East Asian Studies, Freie Universität Berlin

12:30 Lunch Break

1:30 **Panel II: Northeast Asian Institution Building and the Lessons from Europe – Scholarly Perspectives**

Discussants:

Prof. Dr. Alexander Vorontsov, Head of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Prof. Dr. Park Myung-lim, Executive Director of the Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library, Yonsei University, Seoul

Prof. Dr. August Pradetto, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg

Prof. Dr. Remco Breuker, Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University

Dr. Eric J. Ballbach, Institute of Korean Studies, Freie Universität Berlin/German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Moderator: **Dr. Gudrun Wacker**, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

3:30 Coffee Break

4:00 **Panel III: The Role of Germany and Europe in the Maintenance of Peace on the Korean Peninsula**

Discussants:

Prof. Dr. Moon Chung-in, Distinguished Professor, Yonsei University, Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Korea for Foreign Affairs and National Security

H.E. Ganbat Bontoi Damba, Ambassador of Mongolia to Germany

Dr. Werner Pfennig, Institute of Korean Studies, Freie Universität Berlin

Prof. Dr. Michael Staack, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, member of the German-Korean Advisory Body for Foreign Policy Aspects of Unification

Moderator: **Dr. Norbert Baas**, former Ambassador of Germany to the Republic of Korea

Keynote Speech

Can We Still Negotiate with North Korea?

A South Korean Perspective[1]

By Chung-in Moon[2]

A renowned South Korean novelist, Han Gang, contributed a moving column to the *New York Times* under the title of "While the U.S. Talks of War, South Korea Shudders," the New York Times, October 7, 2017. Her wording aptly reflects sentiments of many South Koreans. For 'crisis of April,' 'crisis of August,' 'crisis of October,' and now protracted crisis characterize the country's somber geopolitical reality. Foreign correspondents have been rushing to Seoul to report on the potential escalation of military conflict in Korea and North Korea is the lead items in broadcasts in the U.S. night after night.. Foreigners might enjoy watching such on-the-ground news reports with thrill and suspense, but South Koreans shudder at them by the thought, and prefer to block it out.

Indeed, the Korean Peninsula is back at a crossroads of war and peace. We have not stood this close to the point of no return since the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953. Kim Jong Un's reckless military provocations, Donald Trump's offensive rhetoric and military maneuvers, China's tough position over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea, and domestic polarization in South Korea have trapped the newly inaugurated President Moon Jae-in in a security dilemma with grave implication. The root cause of this quagmire comes from North Korea's unruly pursuit of its nuclear ambitions.

A Nuclear North Korea? Assessing the Reality

Is North Korea a nuclear-weapons state? Legally, no. In accordance with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), North Korea cannot be recognized as a full-fledged nuclear-weapons state. In point of fact, however, it

[1] Prepared for presentation at the Berlin Forum on Korea and Northeast Asia, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, December 2, 2017.

[2] Distinguished University Professor, Yonsei University and Special Advisor to the ROK President on Foreign Affairs and National Security.

cannot be denied that Pyongyang is on the verge of becoming a country with nuclear-weapons capabilities. Several factors point to its nuclear status.

First, over the past eight years—while the Six-Party Talks have remained stalled—North Korea is believed to have steadily amassed nuclear materials and is now estimated to possess an arsenal of more than 10 nuclear warheads. According to a recent analysis by Siegfried Hecker, a renowned nuclear weapons expert, who is the last outsider to visit the North Korea's nuclear complex at Youngbyon, North Korea might have secured sufficient fissile materials for four to eight plutonium weapons and six to 20 highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons, with an annual production capacity of at most one plutonium weapon and possibly six HEU weapons. According to news reports this summer, the intelligence community in the U.S. assessed that North Korea could already possess as many as 60 nuclear bombs. Some analysts project that North Korea could acquire 100 nuclear warheads by year 2020, if its efforts are not interrupted.

Second, North Korea has developed an array of delivery capabilities ranging from short-range Scud B and C missiles (with a range of 300km-500km) and Nodong (with a range of 1,000km) to Musudan intermediate-range missiles (with a range of 3,000km). The Scud B and C, as well as Nodong, missiles are currently operational, but the operational effectiveness of the Musudan has been questioned because four out of its five previous test launches have failed. Nevertheless, Pyongyang was successful in test-launching the Hwasung 12 intermediate-range missile (IRBM) in May and September and the Hwasung 14, an ICBM class long-range ballistic missile, on July 4th and July 28 this year. As Kim Jong Un stated, North Korea is in the "final stage" of developing ICBMs, and Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho stated in his speech to the United Nations that North Korea was "a few steps away" from the "final gate". This can be seen as a game-changing development. Equally worrisome is its acquisition of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).

Third, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests since October 9, 2006, of which five are known to have been successful. The destructive power of its previous five tests was less than 25 kilotons each, roughly the same as the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, but the September 3rd test is estimated to have yielded more than 100 kilotons, which Pyongyang claims was a hydrogen bomb. Although the reliability of this latest nuclear device is still being questioned, Dr. Hecker noted that North Korea must have gone beyond primitive fission-bomb technologies, signifying real progress toward if not initial mastery of a thermonuclear detonation.

Finally, North Korea claims that it has succeeded in diversifying nuclear bombs (fission-bombs, boosted fission-bombs, and hydrogen bombs) as well as making nuclear devices smaller and lighter. It has even declared that it has achieved the standardization of nuclear bombs for mass production.

Judged by its acquisition of nuclear warheads, delivery capabilities, nuclear testing, and the sophistication of its nuclear weapons technology, North Korea is nearing the status of a country with undeniable nuclear-weapons capability. International pressure and sanctions notwithstanding, Kim Jong Un has made it clear that he will

not jettison the North's Byungjin policy (the simultaneous pursuit of economic development and nuclear weapons). Thus, nuclear and missile development will continue not only for their minimal nuclear deterrence, but also for the protection of North Korea's leader (suryong), institutions (jedo), and people (inmin). In addition, domestic legitimacy-building and international prestige has become another driving force behind Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. North Korea's leadership could temporarily halt the country's nuclear and missile development, but is not likely to return to negotiations with denuclearization as a precondition.

We Cannot Tolerate a Nuclear North Korea

The North Korean nuclear threat is thus no longer hypothetical but real, no longer future tense, but here and now. It poses serious security threats to the peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and the world. We cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea for several reasons.

-North Korean nuclear weapons would significantly alter the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately impede inter-Korean peaceful coexistence. Moreover, it will trigger an immense conventional and nuclear arms race on the peninsula.

-Pyongyang's superiority in military power could also tempt its leadership to deliberate on reviving its old strategy of a unified front (Tongil Jeonsun) that attempts to communize South Korea on its own terms. The North has pursued this strategy whenever it was militarily stronger than the South. It might sound illusory, but such possibility cannot be ruled out. For by-law of the Korea Workers' Party still retains such goal in its preamble.

-The regional security impacts would be profound. In addition to strategic instability and spiraling arms races, a nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast Asia.

-And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear materials, technology, and even warheads to other actors, threatening the very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism.

The Moon Jae-in Government's Strategy: Dialogue, Sanctions and Pressure, and Deterrence

President Moon Jae-in's policy goal is to realize a nuclear-free, peaceful, and prosperous Korean peninsula along with North Korea. He has adopted two principles and four strategies to achieve the goal.

The first principle is to denuclearize North Korea. He firmly believes that South Korea cannot peacefully co-exist with a nuclear North Korea and that Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions should be stopped.

The second principle is that there should not be another war on the Korean Peninsula and that the North Korean nuclear problem should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic means. He has said clearly that no country can take military actions on the Korean Peninsula without prior consultation with and the agreement of the South Korean government. This underscores his commitment to peace and opposition to military actions and war.

While adhering to the principles of a "denuclearized North Korea" and "no more war on the Korean Peninsula," President Moon has advanced four strategies. They are dialogue and negotiation, sanctions and pressure, defense and deterrence, and a more proactive role in improving inter-Korean relations and facilitating the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem.

President Moon's first strategic choice is to restore dialogue and negotiation as a viable means of resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. He is well aware of inherent limits to dialogue and negotiation, and absorbed the lessons of the failure of the Six-Party Talks as well as bilateral talks between Pyongyang and Washington. He proposes two track approach in which Pyongyang and Washington engage in bilateral dialogues to resolve the nuclear problem, whereas Seoul and Pyongyang resume talks to address issues pertaining to inter-Korean relations.

He insists that Pyongyang and Washington should find a way to revive their broken channels of communication and engage in meaningful dialogue and negotiation, ultimately including the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Along with this, President Moon is determined to establish parallel bilateral talks with North Korea. He has already proposed to Pyongyang to have Red Cross talks over humanitarian concerns and military talks for tension-reduction along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The Moon government also wants to resume inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, especially on the non-governmental level, within the boundary of international sanctions.

But the North has not yet responded to his proposal. While arguing that dialogue and sanctions cannot go in tandem, Pyongyang has defied Seoul's call for dialogue. More critically, it has repeatedly ignored UN Security Council Resolutions by undertaking one underground nuclear testing and ten missile test launches. As long as South Korea resorts to sanctions and pressure against the North, following the US line, Pyongyang sees no prospect for improving the inter-Korean relations.[3]

[3] In his interview with TASS, a Russian state news agency, Foreign Minister Ri Young-ho of North Korea underscores this point by arguing that "it is first of all necessary that the South Korean authorities should halt their humble submission to the USA in its hostile policy and the campaign of sanctions and pressure against the DPRK. It is important that they should change their policy in favor of the pan-national interaction and measures to cut short acts of aggression and interference from outside."

Second, facing this Pyongyang's reckless challenge, President Moon has to take an alternative strategy. That is sanctions and maximum pressure. The Moon government has closely cooperated with the U.S. and Japan in pushing for tougher sanctions resolutions at the United Nations Security Council and has fully complied with them. Seoul has also pledged to go along with U.S. unilateral sanctions, including secondary boycotts. More importantly, the Moon government has decided to sustain sanction measures adopted by previous conservative governments such as the May 24th measure that bans exchanges and cooperation with the North and the suspension of the Kaesung Industrial Complex and the Mt. Geumgang tourist project.

Third, the Moon government is pursuing a strategy of deterrence and missile defense. Deterrence is a strategy aimed at preventing North Korea from acting in a certain way by threatening to retaliate with credible military force. It is composed of two elements. One is conventional deterrence through the strengthening of ROK-US combined forces and South Korea's self-reliant defense posture. The other is nuclear deterrence through close cooperation and coordination with the U.S. on extended deterrence and the provision of America's nuclear umbrella. Meanwhile, the Moon government strongly opposes the redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil, as well as the development and possession of independent nuclear weapons.

Missile defense constitutes another important component. It is composed of active defense (the Patriot and THAAD systems), passive defense (monthly civil defense exercises), offensive defense (kill chain and massive punishment retaliatory measures), and battle management (command, control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance).

Some suggest compellence as an option that refers to a strategy to make North Korea alter its behavior through the threat or use of force. Whereas deterrence is rather a passive maneuver, compellence is a more assertive move through the deployment of coercive diplomacy. Forward deployment of strategic bombers such as B1B, B-2, B-52, carrier battle groups, and nuclear propelled submarines over the Korean peninsula has been the core of compellence strategy. The U.S. has recently taken this posture, but the Moon Jae-in government has only passively participated in it through mutual consultation.

Finally, President Moon wants to take a more proactive role in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem by facilitating inter-Korean dialogues as well as seeking close consultation with China and Russia. Despite his commitment, however, this strategy has not been effective not only because Pyongyang has not responded to

(http://tass.com/world/964395]/)

his call, but also because sour relationship with Beijing and Moscow over the issue of deployment of American THAAD to South Korea.

These four strategies might look contradictory. In reality, however, they are not. President Moon has always placed top priority on dialogue and negotiation. Nevertheless, he has to combine it with other options, depending on changing circumstances. It should be noted that for him, sanctions and pressures are not an end in itself, but the means to bring the North to dialogue and negotiation table.

The Moon Government's 'Three Nos': No Nukes, No Military Action and No Regime Change

While advocating a three prolonged strategies, the Moon Jae-in government has also been clear in what it rejects. President Moon strongly opposes three options (No Nukes, No Military Action, No Regime Change) that have been widely discussed in South Korea, the U.S., and elsewhere.

First, the Moon government opposes the nuclear armament option. A growing number of people in South Korea are beginning to favor the development of an indigenous nuclear arms program to deal with Pyongyang's nuclear threat. They advocate the independent acquisition of nuclear weapons by arguing that America's nuclear umbrella, provided under the scheme of extended deterrence, is a broken umbrella. But their argument is faulty because American commitment to extended deterrence and its nuclear umbrella is unquestionably firm. Worse is that as soon as South Korea declares its intention to pursue this course, it will face strong headwinds. The nation's nuclear power industry would be ruined, as would the country's traditional alliance with the United States. The South Korean economy would risk facing international sanctions that could send it into a tailspin. Moreover, South Korea going nuclear could be a tipping point that triggers a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia. These factors have made the Moon government oppose the nuclear option.

Moreover, a nuclear armed Northeast Asia would not benefit the United States. Judged by the overall public sentiment in Washington, it would be extremely difficult for the U.S. to maintain alliances with a nuclear Japan and/or South Korea. Such a development is likely to lead to a loss of American allies in the region. More importantly, the U.S. would lose its "hegemonic" influence over the region. Japan and South Korea armed with nuclear weapons would not be likely to comply with American demands. They would comply only when extended deterrence and America's provision of its nuclear umbrella remain valid and operational.

Some South Korean pundits advocate the redeployment and co-sharing of American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, if an independent nuclear option is unworkable. But the Moon government has formally rejected bringing U.S. nukes onto South Korean soil since it violates the principle of a denuclearized Korean

peninsula and undermines the demand for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korean nuclear programs and weapons. Such deployment could also trigger tense nuclear arms races in Northeast Asia. The introduction of nuclear warheads would also introduce new risks both in terms of public safety to South Koreans and escalatory risks and miscalculations in deterring North Korea. It is playing with fire. Despite remarks by certain U.S. officials hinting at such possibility, the U.S. is not likely to accommodate such request because of strategic, tactical, budgetary, and logistic reasons.

Second, the Moon government opposes resolutely military actions, be they preemption and/or preventive war. This opposition is grounded in basic cost-benefit analysis. Once initiated, a conflict would be difficult if not impossible to contain, and the human and economic costs of war on the Korean Peninsula would be staggering. With a huge civilian population living within artillery range and the largest economies in the world within missile range, South Korea, Asia and the world simply have too much to lose from a war with North Korea—which has very little to lose and will fight to the death.

And for what benefit? There is a low probability of achieving the desired military and political objectives. Destroying North Korea's nuclear assets (nuclear facilities, materials, and warheads) that are distributed, concealed, and bunkered against attack, as well as its mobile missile-launching sites, will not be easy. Given the fortified command-and-control system, targeting and decapitating the country's political leadership and solving the "designated survivor" problem will be virtually impossible. Meanwhile, North Korea's massive retaliatory capabilities and subsequent escalation of military conflict would entail grave human casualties in the South and economic catastrophe on a global basis.

Finally, the Moon government is also skeptical of regime change involving the removal of the North Korean leadership. On several occasions, including his speech in Berlin on July 6, President Moon clearly said that he will seek neither regime change in the North nor unification by absorption on South Korean terms. He believes these are neither desirable nor feasible. It is not desirable because such a move would undermine mutual trust, while stiffening Pyongyang's hostility. And it is not feasible in the short run because removing North Korea's leadership is extremely difficult from a practical standpoint. And the collapse of the Kim Jong Un regime would not necessarily mean the end of the DPRK as a sovereign state. The military or military-party collective leadership could easily replace the Kim regime, and any new leadership is likely to show the same behavior. Mass uprising could bring about an abrupt end to the regime, but at present this seems very unlikely. Moreover, loss of control over weapons of mass destruction in the wake of political and social chaos is another reason why the Moon government is less receptive to leadership or regime change. We must be vigilant in opposing "solutions" that actually make the original problem worse, while creating new ones that are even more dangerous.

Dialogue and Negotiation are Still Possible: Some Personal Observations

It is not east to talk about the resumption of dialogue and negotiations with North Korea. For Washington, the principal partner for dialogue argues that Pyongyang has not only shown unbearably provocative behavior, but also breached trust on numerous occasions in its negotiations with the U.S. And such brutal acts as the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, an elder brother of Kim Jong Un, critically ruined its international image. And sanctions and pressure cannot be avoided as long as North Korea violates UN Security Council sanction resolutions. The Moon Jae-in government will continue to take a tough stance on North Korea in close cooperation with the U.S. and the international community. However, I believe that there is still room for dialogue and negotiation with North Korea. William Perry in his recent column in The Washington Post argued that we need to "talk first, get tough later." I agree with him. I believe engagement, dialogue and negotiations with North Korea are still the most credible way of handling Pyongyang. Obama's policy of strategic patience and Park Geun-hye's 'trust politics' ultimately failed simply because pressure and sanctions outweighed engagement and dialogue, which in turn demolished the foundation for mutual trust-building. Nevertheless, past failure should not serve as an excuse for not engaging with the North.

Washington and Pyongyang are the only two countries that can resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. They should talk. Despite its chronic rhetorical rejection, I personally see some signs of North Korea's willingness to talk with the U.S., and it is up to the U.S. to probe in a proactive way at the highest level possible. The role of President Trump is, thus, of paramount importance. He should avoid a war of words. Such hostile rhetoric as "no choice but to totally destroy North Korea" and "little rocket man on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime" is counter-productive. He needs to open channels of communication with the North, and should even consider dispatching a high-level special envoy to Pyongyang. It is also essential to avoid demonizing the North. Incentives and disincentives should be flexibly combined and presented. Finally, President Trump should send a clear and encouraging message to North Korea and the world that the North Korean nuclear quagmire can be peacefully resolved.

In so doing, five things should be kept in mind. First, frankness, two-way understanding, and trust-building should be the basic guiding principles of a diplomatic approach. We must speak our minds and also hear out Pyongyang in order to find mutually acceptable solutions. Being deaf to the North or yelling back at Pyongyang, while insisting on unilateral preconditions, won't lead us to a way forward. Portraying the North as a "band of criminals" will only reinforce the perception that relations are asymmetrical, hindering meaningful dialogue and negotiation. North Korea might be demonic, but we should not demonize Pyongyang.

Second, prioritization of agenda in dealing with North Korea seems essential. Pyongyang has been subject to international criticism over several issues such as

nuclear weapons, chemical-biological weapons, reckless behavior in cyber security, massive violations of human rights, and deterioration of conditions of basic human needs. We cannot solve all these issues at once and for all. We need to prioritize them in the order of urgency. Primary attention should be paid to the nuclear issue. Progress made in this issue will eventually lead to breakthroughs to other areas through mutual trust-building. Otherwise, there will be no way-out to the North Korean quagmire.

Third, the diplomatic approach must be practical and realistic. Goals for negotiations must be adjusted to changing circumstances. We must face the reality that we cannot make North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities in the short term. Instead, we should seek a moratorium on its nuclear program to prevent further production of nuclear materials. Pyongyang repeatedly said it would cease nuclear activities if terms were met. In this regard, Siegfried Hecker's step-by-step approach of "freeze, roll-back, and verifiably dismantle" might provide us with a viable exit strategy. Practical ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum might be found in existing agreements that emerged from the Six-Party Talks.

Fourth, flexible negotiations should be another guideline. We must put all possible cards on the table, including a temporary halt to joint South Korea–U.S. military drills, replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, allowance of North Korea's peaceful use of atomic energy and space/satellite program, and normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States. We must not exclude these options just because they are being demanded by Pyongyang. While addressing issues through dialogue, we could probe Pyongyang's intentions and demand accountability for breach of faith.

Finally, a mechanism for dialogue should be restored. In my opinion, the Six-Party Talks are still the best venue for negotiation. Concerned parties can have bilateral, trilateral, four-party, and five-party talks within the six-party framework. In addition, the September 19th joint statement is still the best diplomatic document for denuclearizing North Korea. Deliberating on alternative mechanisms for dialogue and negotiation will be time-consuming. The situation now is critical and we do not have time to spare.[4]

[4] The idea that dialogue and negotiations are still possible hinges critically on whether Kim Jong Un, in fact, believes this. Dialogue with North Korea without any preconditions is needed to figure out his real intention and terms of negotiation.

Participants

Prof. Dr. Eun-Jeung Lee is the director of the Institute of Korean Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. She studied political science, social science and ethnology at Ewha Womans University, Seoul, and Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. In 1993, she received her PhD in political science from the University of Göttingen. In 2001, she completed her habilitation at Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. As of 2016, Prof. Lee is a member of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Her main fields of research are political theory and the political history of ideas, both viewed from an intercultural perspective in particular, and the politics, society, and culture of Korea and East Asia.

Prof. Dr. MOON Chung-in is Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Korea for Foreign Affairs and National Security and Distinguished Professor at Yonsei University, Seoul. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Maryland in 1984 and was later appointed Professor at the Department of Political Science of Yonsei University. He served as adviser to presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008).

Prof. Dr. Volker Deville is Professor for Governance and International Management at Bayreuth University. He is the Founding Director of F/L Think Tank, dealing with future studies. Having graduated in mathematics, he earned a PhD in economics from the European University Institute. In 1989, he joined the *Allianz Group* and moved to South Korea in 2000 as Deputy CEO of *Allianz Life Insurance*. From 2005 to 2016, he has served as Executive Vice President of *Allianz SE*.

Jürgen Klimke is a former Member of the German Federal Parliament (CDU) and CEO of *Industrie-Contact AG*. He studied law at the University of Hamburg. In 1970, he joined the CDU and served as Chairman to the CDU *Kreisverband Hamburg-Wandsbek* from 2003 to 2008, also serving as Vice-Chairman to the CDU in Hamburg. From 2002 to 2017, he was a Member of the German Federal Parliament and from 2009 onwards served as Chairman to the CDU / CSU parliamenttary group in the Committee for Economic Ccooperation and Development.

Dr. Norbert Baas served as German Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia, ASEAN, and East Timor (2009-2012), as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2006-2009), and as Special Envoy for Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus at the German Foreign Office (2003-2006). From 2001 to 2003, he served as Ambassador-at-Large for security issues. Previously, he had served as German Ambassador to Georgia and Head of the Division for Central Eastern Europe (1995-1998). Dr. Baas studied economics at the Technische Universität Berlin and at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Europe in Bologna, Italy, and earned a PhD from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Michael Geier served as German Ambassador to Bulgaria (2006-2009), to the Republic of Korea (2003-2006), and to Burkina Faso (1985-1988) respectively. He studied law at the universities of Bonn, Kiel, and Freiburg. In 1970, he earned his International and Comparative Human Rights Law Diploma from the René Cassin International Institute for Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.

Dr. Hans-Ulrich Seidt is a non-resident fellow of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, USA, and former Director General for Culture and Communication at the German Foreign Office. He served as German Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2009-2012) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2006-2008). He studied law, political science, and history at the universities of Tübingen, Geneva, and Bonn and at the École Nationale d'Administration in Paris, France. In 1983, he received his PhD from the University of Bonn.

Jun.-Prof. Dr. Hannes B. Mosler is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies of Freie Universität Berlin. He received his PhD from Seoul National University in 2011. His main fields of research are political parties, political systems, constitutional law, and policy decision processes in Korea.

Prof. Dr. Alexander Vorontsov is the director of the Korean and Mongolian Studies Department at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He serves as Vice Secretary General of the International Society for Korean Studies (ISKS). He is a professor at the Military Sciences Academy of the Russian Federation and an instructor at the M.V. Lomonosov State University. He received his PhD in history from the Institute of Oriental Studies at the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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Prof. em. Dr. August Pradetto is Professor Emeritus of Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg/ Universität der Bundeswehr and former professor at the Hong Kong Baptist University. He studied political science, journalism and German studies and holds a PhD from Freie Universität Berlin. His research topics include foreign policy and regional security in Europe, international crisis management, German foreign and security policy, foreign operations of the Bundeswehr, the transformation of post-communist systems, and security in Central Asia.

Prof. Dr. Remco Breuker is Professor of Korean Studies at Leiden University and Director of the Leiden Asia Centre. He holds degrees in Japanese Studies and Korean Studies from Leiden University and received his PhD in Korean History from that same university in 2006. As a historian focusing on Korea and Northeast Asia, he works on medieval Korean and Northeast Asian history and contemporary North Korean affairs.

Dr. Eric J. Ballbach is Director of the Research Unit II "North Korea and International Security" at the Institute of Korean Studies at Freie Universität Berlin and fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). He received his PhD from the University of Trier. His main fields of research are: the foreign policies of North and South Korea, identity politics in Northeast Asia, critical international relations theory, and regionalization processes in East Asia.

Dr. Gudrun Wacker is Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Her areas of expertise are East Asia, China, Taiwan, defence and security policy/armed forces, maritime security, and political systems.

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