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Rethinking Nationalism

The rise, or reemergence, of nationalist rhetoric in many parts of the world in recent years confronts academic historians with new questions and challenges. Historians may be temperamentally slow to respond to short-term political exigencies, but, as Pieter Judson highlights in his contribution to this *AHR* History Lab forum about the global history of nationalism, they are increasingly "required to serve at the forefront of efforts to revive a kind of militant nationalism." Looking back on our discipline's long-standing history as a purveyor of nationalist myths, Eric Hobsbawm once explained that "historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market."[1] But are there more addicts today? If so, what does this entail for our poppy growing and for our fields at large? In the following short essays, twelve historians discuss these questions from the vantage point of their various areas of specialization.

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The resulting differences in perspective and argument notwithstanding, the contributions all concur on the need to overcome *methodological nationalism*. By this term, most contributors to this forum seem primarily to have in mind one or two of the three variants once identified by Nina Glick Schiller and Andreas Wimmer: "naturalization" of "the boundaries of the nation-state [as] the unit of analysis" or "territorial limitation … to the … boundaries of a particular nation-state."[2] There appears to be little appetite among them to roll back our discipline's transnational and global turn. This consensus is remarkable as a joint starting point, considering how much longer it took to erode the profession's stubborn methodological nationalism than to realign its political preferences away from political nationalism.

Perhaps precisely because the rejection of methodological nationalism, and the pursuant demand to go "beyond" the nation-state, is nowadays so commonplace among professional historians in Western academia, it has become less clear what it actually entails for the historical study of nationalism. Some sort of denaturalization of the nation-state may well be a necessary precondition for the historical study of nationalism, thereby preventing Glick Schiller and Wimmer's third variant of methodological nationalism: "ignoring or disregarding the fundamental importance of nationalism for modern societies."[3] Yet the more fundamental problems lie in the relationship between the three variants. While it is easy to see how the transnational and global turn in history corrodes naturalization and territorial limitation, it is less clear how it relates to the dimension of ignoring.

As several of the contributors here make clear, the scholarship of the past decades has firmly entrenched the view that the global rise and spread of the nation-state form cannot be understood as having emerged from within single (nationally defined) societies, which then traveled as an intellectual template from one place to the next.[4] Instead the nation-state should be seen as an integral part of global processes itself. But, as this forum reveals, beyond widespread agreement looms a multiplicity of viewpoints that have emerged alongside each other after the boom in nationalism studies—created by the Yugoslav Wars and the breakup of the Soviet Union—had abated.

One group of contributors to this forum, including Cemil Aydin, Frederick Cooper, and Pieter Judson underlines, to borrow Aydin's words, that "none of the dominant narratives about the naturalness and inevitability of the nation-states … matches with the historical experiences." In this view, it is our job to point to what Judson calls the "contingency of national loyalties" in the past, to the tenuous and contrived nature of nationalist identity constructions, and to the longevity and viability of nonnational modes of political affiliation.[5] Other contributors caution that this approach could precisely end up "ignoring or disregarding the fundamental importance of nationalism." According to Aviel Roshwald, there "can be analytical costs to the elevation of contingency to the status of historical-explanation-by-default

Frontis: "Ukrainian protests near General Consulate of Russian Federation, Odessa, Ukraine, 26 November 2018," copyright Aleksandra Ignateva/Shutterstock.com.

1 Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today," *Anthropology Today* 8.1 (1992): 3.

2 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration," *International Migration Review* 37.3 (2003): 578.

3 Wimmer and Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration," 577.

4 This was a major part of the discussion several decades ago, following Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London, 1983) and Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (London, 1986).

5 See also Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation* (Princeton, NJ, 2014) and Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).

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of all that appears unreasonable or irrational about the world as we find it." He insists that from pointing to the difficulty of predicting the contours of later nation-states "it is quite the leap to conclude that therefore the existence of the global system of nationhood and nation-states … is merely the fluke product of a highly contingent set of circumstances." In his contribution, Richard Drayton maintains that by the end of World War II "nationalism and state-making were, in practice, the only ideological options on the table."

A large set of contributors emphasizes the interrelationship between national and nonnational modes of identification. Nicola Miller does so by stressing the benefits of an "innately transnational field," the history of knowledge, to conceptualize nations as "communities of knowledge." Glenda Sluga points out that historically, too, the "study of nationalism" often coincided with "anti-national … cosmopolitan methodologies." And Grace Ballor, Sebastian Conrad, Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, and Sandrine Kott all highlight the degree to which nationalism has long nestled within, or coincided with, supposedly countervailing phenomena, such as supranational integration, racial identity constructions or continental regionalism, empire, and internationalism—a constellation that reverberates today.

It is so far unclear whether and how the recent historiography summarized in this forum can feed some sort of renewal in theories of nationalism. Apart from polyphony and our discipline's characteristic caution when it comes to grand theorizing, there may be an additional obstacle to making the history of nationalism serve a better understanding of today's "new nationalism."[6] Our habit of exploring the "origins and spread of nationalism," as per the subtitle of Benedict Anderson's famous book, rather than its endurance and mutation,[7] may leave us ill-equipped to theory-building beyond the confines of our discipline. Kott's point as to how social states grounded nationhood in everyday practice may offer some clues for this endurance. And Lydia Walker's contribution about national minorities in the wake of decolonization speaks to what Judson identifies as "a common dynamic fundamental to nationalism … its inability to attain satiety." Taken together, the following twelve contributions allow us not only to take stock of the historiography of nationalism after the global turn, but also to open avenues to pursue in light of the past years' recrudescence of nationalism in many parts of the world.

Michael Goebel

6 "The New Nationalism" was the title of the March/April 2019 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, for instance, even as most contributors said little about how this supposedly "new" nationalism differs from its older incarnations.

7 See, however, Aviel Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism* (Cambridge, 2006) for an exception of sorts.

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Nicola Miller

Knowledge and Nationalism

In the current age, most of our main concerns have significant epistemological foundations. Populism is, at least in part, a sustained blast against the principles and values of the European Enlightenment. It mobilizes against a particular form of rationality, expertise, and complexity; it dismisses the possibility of disinterested knowledge. Instead, populism celebrates emotions, customs, common sense, boldness, simplicity, and a division of the world into us and them, conjuring up bogeymen from clouds of ignorance. Populists like to cite research by psychologists showing that we all select the information that feeds our pre-established view of the world; they deny anyone's claims to have transcended their own self-interest in pursuit of understanding, so that notions of truth and fact go into freefall amid a volley of cries of "fake news." Long-established relationships between information, impartiality, and truth have thereby been disrupted. Little common ground remains on which to test competing claims to knowledge. This convergence of trends raises problems that go far beyond formal or informal barriers to access. It compels a radical questioning of what constitutes knowledge, a matter which is inextricably bound up with questions about the creation and distribution of knowledge.

This contemporary context makes it worth considering the potential of the history of knowledge to enhance our understanding of nationalism. The case for this emerging field of history rests on a present-driven appreciation of the exponential rise in significance of knowledge in the twenty-first century, combined with an awareness that the extensive historiography on the topic has fallen under the radar because it has been dispersed over numerous subfields: history of science, medicine, education, and the disciplines; institutions such as monasteries, universities, or academies of learning; and intellectuals and ideas, political thought, ideologies, mentalities, and cosmologies.[8] At first sight, it may seem that the concerns of the history of knowledge are remote from the harsh realities of power struggles, competition for economic resources, and ideologically charged mobilizations that characterize nationalism. Since the 1990s, however, the central insight of sociologists, such as Manuel Castells, that the field of knowledge is in itself a locus of societal change has affected the way that historians think. In particular, transnational or global historians have explored how configurations of knowledge shaped the scope for agency, sovereignty, and solidarity in multiple ways all over the world.[9]

8 Peter Burke, *What Is the History of Knowledge?* (Oxford, 2016), is a good short introduction, synthesising scholarly traditions from Europe and the Americas. The lack of visibility of the cumulative power of knowledge in history is compounded by the fact that much of the relevant research has been done in other disciplines, especially anthropology, geography, subaltern studies, and postcolonial studies.

9 Manuel Castells, *The Information Age*, 3 vols. (Malden, 1996–1998). For a pioneering historical study drawing on Castells, see Christopher Bayly, *Empire and Information* (Cambridge, 1996). See also Christophe Charle, Jürgen Schriewer, and Peter Wagner, *Transnational Intellectual Networks* (Frankfurt 2004); Jürgen Renn, *The Evolution of Knowledge* (Princeton, 2020).

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It follows that the history of knowledge has the potential to transform historical approaches to the study of nationalism and to do so in ways that are relevant to understanding the contemporary reinvigoration of nationalist politics in multiple sites around the world. In particular, I suggest that there is rich analytical potential in thinking about nations as communities of knowledge, instead of continuing to accept Benedict Anderson's invitation— given nearly a half century ago—to see them as "imagined communities."[10] The idea of nations as communities of knowledge offers several advantages over that of imagined communities. For one, the imagined community posits a rupture with the past and a modernist conception of the nation, while the idea of the nation as a knowledge community allows for the incorporation of premodern forms of knowledge. Anderson famously borrowed Walter Benjamin's phrase "homogeneous empty time" to indicate the sense of "meanwhile" that he saw as a precondition for imagining the national community. Since then, historians of nationalism have focused on the creation of this peculiarly modern and spatially extended sense of simultaneity, through newspapers and novels, maps and censuses.[11] Yet one of the strengths of nationalism has been its capacity to offer a narrative arc spanning past, present, and future: it is at once synchronic and diachronic. Switching the focus from imagining to knowledge opens up an analytical framework in which it becomes possible to bring together aspects of nationalism that are often treated separately in the historiography. It invites tracing of continuities and ruptures, both constructions of the past and visions of the future. It also compels the historian to explore the archives of state-building and national identity creation in relation to each other, and to take account of the oft-neglected role of the market in both processes.[12] The history of knowledge offers a unique lens for exploring how ways of imagining and experiencing the nation are created and sustained by a variety of stimuli from both near and far, the global and the local, each in their multiple formations. It also obliges transnational historians to pay due attention to blockages, resistances, absences, omissions, and silos, thereby avoiding the temptation to privilege movement, connection, and flow at the expense of stasis, isolation, and social structure.

It is important to recognize that knowledge poses tricky questions of definition, which in themselves highlight global histories of academic power. The English use of the generic term "knowledge," which pulls together a variety of ways of knowing—abstract, experiential, tacit—has no equivalent in other modern European languages, where a distinction is embedded between at least two different kinds of knowledge. It is a line variously drawn in the different tongues, but fundamentally it distinguishes between knowing-from-learning and knowing-from-experience (for example, *conocer/saber*, *connaître/savoir*, *kennen/wissen*). Yet arguably the capacious English term has its advantages, if taken as a prompt for posing a range of questions about the politics, geography, and sociology of knowledge. It avoids entrenching certain binary

10 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London, [1983] 1991).

11 For example, Sara Castro-Klarén and John Charles Chasteen, *Beyond Imagined Communities* (Washington, DC, 2003).

12 Here, there are synergies with Steven G. Marks's conception of early modern capitalism as a concentration of flows in information. See Marks, *The Information Nexus* (New York, 2016).

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divides (e.g., theoretical/practical or pure/applied), all of which register hierarchies of privilege and status both within and between societies. It enables questions of race, gender, and colonialism always to be asked but without prejudging the answers. It makes it possible to bring into the frame of analysis the diversity of ways, both formal and informal, in which knowledge is created, thereby making visible the gatekeeping practices and epistemological biases that mean some kinds of knowledge are recognized and accorded high status, while other kinds are despised, ignored, suppressed, or eliminated.

A good example of how the history of knowledge can offer an illuminating new perspective is education, long analyzed as a tool for governments to propagate their official version of national identity. While historians of education have focused on the extension of formal schooling to the whole population and on evaluating its successes and failures in fulfilling certain policies and practices, historians of knowledge would raise further questions about how knowledge is transmitted from one generation to the next. They would inquire into which ways of knowing were privileged and the extent to which these epistemic virtues were reinforced or challenged by the implementation of education on the ground and by the responses it generated from those involved. Any educational practice, whether carried out in an institution, such as a school or a university, or in a more informal setting, such as a working men's club or a traveling theater company, involves the participation of a wide range of people fulfilling certain roles: making, implementing, and assessing policy; organizing and administering; or teaching, learning, and supporting learning. People mobilize around who is taught, what is taught, and how it is taught. Education, especially state schooling, in some times and places has supported the functioning of capitalist economies, while in others it has created conditions to mobilize against them. But education is not only schooling. In some contexts, for example late nineteenth-century Chile or Peru, many people acquired literacy in the labor movement or the military rather than in state schools. It is only by asking questions about the history of knowledge that the full picture becomes clear. The education sector, broadly defined, is a major site for making and remaking the epistemologies of the nation as well as its customs, conventions, and values. Given that for the past forty years neoliberals, like liberals before them, have made education the panacea for all social ills, it is salutary to be reminded by historians of knowledge of the unintended consequences that can ensue from attempts at top-down social engineering.

The idea of nations as communities of knowledge highlights the fluidity and diversity of concentrations of power across a territory, which is likely to be overlooked by a geopolitical perspective that will focus on economic or political significance. Concentrations of knowledge can generate alternative locations of power, most obviously in university towns or port cities, where the incessant traffic of visitors and imported information introduces a dynamic different from that of a capital city

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or an economically powerful region. Thinking about the field of knowledge helps historians to map the shifting locales of currents for and against nationhood, making it possible to look beyond debates in the capital cities to explore the provincial connections and loyalties which are so crucial to a sense of national cohesion. As a result, it becomes easier to trace the participation—or not, as the case may be—of a wide range of inhabitants in the tasks of nation-making, and to identify the factors that explain degrees of inclusion or exclusion. By looking across the subfields of natural science, geography, and cartography in my own research on nation-making in nineteenth-century Spanish America, I saw how prominent a contribution knowledge of the land had made to fostering national consciousness in countries where the conventional markers of a different language or culture were absent.[13] It was not only literary representations of the countryside and its peoples that contributed to national identities, but also the accumulation and processing of stores of knowledge, which, like the nations themselves, were the product of a wide range of people located throughout the territories. Amateur stargazers based hundreds of miles from the capital city gathered the data to be analyzed by new state funded observatories; amateur botanists and geologists who knew their local terrain collected the samples that enabled researchers in national museums or, later, ministries of development, to build up a picture of their country's natural resources. Many of these sites of knowledge opened windows onto the interactions between transnational and local dynamics in nation-formation: classification schemes devised in the academies of European learning tended to fall apart, for example, when they came up against the specialist knowledge of Indigenous observers of their environment.

Historians sometimes seem to risk going to such lengths to avoid methodological nationalism that they have little to offer by way of explanation for the historical phenomenon of nationalism, treating it as a byproduct of other, more significant processes, whether global or local. In this respect, one strength of history of knowledge is that it works to denaturalize, so in any particular historical context the historian of knowledge interested in nationalism is bound to start with a set of questions about how and by whom the "nation" is conceived. What did the idea mean, what alternatives were available, why did nationhood prevail? And if, as so many historians have accepted, the impulse first took the form of an imaginary, a history of knowledge perspective can help to account for why the idea took hold, what and who identified with it, and how it was sustained. If nationalism always entails an aspirational element, the idea of nations as knowledge communities offers a focused yet flexible way of addressing the question that nobody from the social sciences or humanities has really answered satisfactorily: Why has nationalism continued to matter so deeply to such a wide range of people in so many different societies across the world?

There are risks, of course, as with any specific historical approach. A focus on cultural change (or, especially in the current moment, on

13 Nicola Miller, *Republics of Knowledge* (Princeton, 2020).

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"culture wars") can be a substitute for making economic change in ideological, political, or historiographical terms. A good history of knowledge would raise those issues in relation to its objects of study. Any history of knowledge will also be a history of ignorance. Ernest Renan's famous formula about nations being based on a shared agreement to remember certain things and forget others is more resonant (because it opens up questions of agency beyond an elite of intellectuals to the wider population) if reworked as a pact to choose to know or find out about/discuss certain things and to remain ignorant of others.[14] As with knowing, there's a broad spectrum of agency in relation to the production of ignorance.[15]

The history of knowledge, like any other field of modern historiography, has work to do to decolonize itself. Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, writing about the practice of science in the Spanish Empire, drew attention to the dominance of the "epistemological liberal regime of facts, objectivity, skepticism, print culture, the public sphere, and the Republic of Letters," which differed from the epistemologies and methodologies he found in his sources.[16] Thinking about the nineteenth century in Spanish America, I found it misleading to start from European-style institutions of universities or learned academies, because even when they were important in local culture they were rarely the sites of innovation or change. As a field of inquiry emerging in the wake of postcolonial and decolonial theory, the history of knowledge has a great opportunity to build a set of non-Eurocentric concepts and tools.[17]

Aviel Roshwald

Does the History of Nationalism Still Matter?

The flight from methodological nationalism has generated a wealth of productive scholarship and provocative historical reinterpretations over recent decades.[18] Multinational empires, once seen as reactionary anachronisms—authoritarian at worst and paternalistic at best—whose disintegration was a foregone conclusion in a modern age of popular sovereignty and nationalism, have been reexamined as polities whose adaptive techniques of managing cultural diversity and interethnic tensions are deserving of serious examination.[19] Conversely, historians have highlighted the role empires themselves have played in cynically sponsoring projects of self-determination as legitimizing mechanisms for their own informal expansion.[20] For their part, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century nationalists have lost their former luster as selfless liberators of their people, reduced instead to the less glamorous role

14 Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?* (Paris, 1882).

15 Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger, *Agnotology* (Stanford, 2008).

16 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "On Ignored Global 'Scientific Revolutions,'" *Journal of Early Modern History* 21.5 (2017).

17 Inspiration can be found in the work of sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, especially his *The End of the Cognitive Empire* (Durham, 2018).

18 The term *methodological nationalism* appears in Herminio Martins, "Time and Theory in Sociology," in *Approaches to Sociology*, ed. John Rex (Abingdon, 1974); the concept was further developed in Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration," *International Migration Review* 37.3 (2003).

19 Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference* (Cambridge, 2008); Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.

20 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity* (Lanham, MD, 2003); Borislav Chernev, *Twilight of Empire* (Toronto, 2017); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians* (Oxford, 2015).

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of "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs," whose campaigns were driven and molded by the very indifference of the masses rather than by their eagerness to be "freed."[21] Even the inevitability of colonial empires' disintegration into self-declared nation-states has been called into question by historians who have explored the democratic-federalist paths not taken during the period that has been retroactively labeled as the era of decolonization.[22]

It seems fair to say that the exploration of these alternative avenues of understanding has been driven by a combination of methodological and normative motivations. Finding ways of thinking outside the national box and highlighting the contingent aspects of historical trajectories from empires to nation-states clearly affords us the possibility of a critical perspective on a sociocultural and political construct (the nation-state) whose inevitability and inescapability can otherwise be taken almost unthinkingly for granted. A justifiable sense of horror about the brutalities and atrocities committed in the name of nationalism during the past century and more has also no doubt motivated the search for alternative historical scenarios and reawakened a degree of nostalgia for imperial models of dealing with diversity that appear in retrospect to have afforded greater latitude for ethnocultural hybridity and ambiguity than possible amid the reductionist pressures associated with the stereotypical twentieth-century nation-state.

But every methodology is bound to run into its own share of epistemological limitations, even as it opens up new avenues of exploration. Highlighting the role of the contingent in history has been a useful method of bringing critical perspective to the reductionist narratives of shared destiny and collective character typical of nationalist historiographies. Yet there can be analytical costs to the elevation of contingency to the status of historical explanation by default of all that appears unreasonable or irrational about the world as we find it.[23] It is true that specific historical paths (such as the course of development leading to the triumph of one particular conception of ethnonational identity as the basis for any given state's claim to political legitimacy) and certain pivotal moments (such as the tipping point leading to the disintegration of an empire) can be shown to have been rife with alternative possible outcomes. Compelling cases have been made to the effect that the idiosyncratic set of criteria that emerged as markers of belonging to any given nation—or the territorial and ethnodemographic contours that became the basis for any particular postcolonial state's boundaries and composition—were contingent outcomes that could not necessarily have been predicted far in advance and that in fact remain fluid and subject to change. But it would be a mistake to therefore conclude that the existence of the global system of nationhood and nation-states (imagined and notional though they may be) in which we live is itself merely the fluke product of a highly contingent set of circumstances. The very fact that so many varied historical paths across multiple continents over the course of the past several centuries have led to the planet-wide

21 Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities," *Slavic Review* 69.1 (2010).

22 Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*; Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization* (Ithaca, 2008).

23 A similar line of argument with respect to Eastern European nationalism is developed in John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations* (Princeton, 2020), 19–24.

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emergence, in successive waves, of self-declared nation-states suggests that this has been a heavily overdetermined outcome—one that cries out for further exploration and explanation.

Illustrative of how our vision can be distorted by a preoccupation with contingency are those intriguing intervals in late imperial histories when representatives of peripheries centered their demands on equality within, rather than secession from, empires. On the face of it, these moments can be seen as evidence of the potential that empires had to reinvent themselves on the basis of federative equality and inclusivity. Yet in practice, the prospect of formerly subject populations or subordinate groups gaining equal access to power and resources almost invariably spooked core populations and metropolitan elites. Whether it be in the case of an eighteenth-century British Parliament refusing equal representation for American colonists or of a post-1945 French hexagon rejecting the new political geometry of empire-wide democratization, the prospects of such radical reform regularly produced backlashes at the center and consequent crises of legitimacy in the periphery that led—slowly, painfully, yet inexorably—to the disintegration of empires and the emergence, seemingly by default, of independent nation-states. Why was this so consistently the outcome? In my own view, this is intimately linked with the ubiquitous rise of popular sovereignty as the legitimizing principle for political authority. It seems hard to imagine a political system based on the concept of popular sovereignty that does not end up in some way incorporating and institutionalizing the idea of nationhood.[24] Empires could certainly prove quite adept at handling the challenges of ethnocultural and religious diversity, but let us not fool ourselves: they did so most successfully, in their heydays, on the basis of relatively rigid status hierarchies and unapologetically institutionalized inequalities. Either alternatively or in tandem with such features, imperial states could and did propagate their own forms of militaristic patriotism and even "official nationalism"[25] (not to speak of carrying out genocide in the case of the late Ottoman Empire), which once again points to the growing pervasiveness of the national idea in a modernizing world. But regardless of which factors one sees as decisive, recognizing the repeated triumph across time and space of the concept (contradiction-ridden though it is) of national self-determination over imperial-reform proposals constitutes an important corrective to the counterfactual scenarios that seem so appealing in telling the history of any particular case of imperial dissolution.

If frustration with the failings of the nation-state model fueled interest in earlier imperial models of ordered heterogeneity, the accelerating globalization processes of the late Cold War and early post–Cold War period contributed to a widespread perception that the nation-state was past its heyday, on its way to supersession by a growing complex of intersecting transnational networks, supranational institutions, and international norms. Western academics' own facility at escaping the bounds of the nation via international travel, research, and conferences

24 Bernard Yack, "Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism," *Political Theory* 29.4 (2001).

25 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 85–114.

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may have contributed to the widespread perception among scholars in the Global North that globalization was rapidly consigning the nation-state and nationalism to mothballs. It may also have reinforced a tendency to see such trends in a mostly positive light—as furthering the prospects of a borderless world of shared norms and convergent interests—even as one of the most notable points of intersocietal convergence was the growing income gap within each country.

The rise of such expectations has made the shock at the past few years' resurgence of authoritarian chauvinism and virulent anti-immigrant sentiment in some of the world's largest and most influential democracies all the greater. So how should scholars of nationalism respond? Academic researchers are rightfully wary of shifting paradigms abruptly in response to the ebbs and flows of contemporaneous events, but inevitably, our perspective on the landscape of the past is altered as the ground shifts beneath our feet. At the dawn of the second millennium's third decade, we have become all too acutely aware that populist authoritarianism and politicized xenophobia can be just as readily disseminated via transnational linkages and communications as can pluralistic and universalistic values. The transnational is not intrinsically transcendent. It is, perhaps, not entirely coincidental that a growing body of work has been exploring the transnational and international connections among fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s.[26] This approach has proved analytically and conceptually valuable. It could fruitfully be adapted to the study of interlinkages among extremist nationalisms in Axis-occupied countries and client states in Europe and Asia during the Second World War, among other possible spheres of investigation.

By the same token, it may be timely to revisit the role of patriotism in the context of the nation-state—that is, attachment and loyalty to one's nation or the state or movement that claims to embody it—as a frame of reference that can contribute in substantive, and sometimes even constructive, ways to shaping people's political choices amid stressful domestic or global conditions, including in the face of illiberal transnational movements.[27] It would, of course, be naive to reduce patriotism to a simple formula for distinguishing between honorable and dishonorable options in the public sphere. There is no denying that a broad range of agendas and interests can be and have been advanced—often quite cynically—by advocates wrapping themselves in their nation's flag, to the point that patriotism may appear to consist of a hollow shell rather than a coherent set of values. It has certainly been used to try and stifle dissent in the face of injustice and to mobilize support for aggressive wars. Yet, as many others have argued, in the political arena it may be all the more important to deny chauvinists, racists, and militarists a monopoly on patriotism's emotive power.

In the academic sphere, it may behoove us to complement the continued study of nationalism's fallacies and excesses with scholarship that explores historical cases of democratic and progressive movements' substantive engagement with patriotic or inclusively nationalist

26 See, for example, Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism* (Durham, 2010); Benjamin G. Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).

27 The case for patriotism (in his formulation as a contrast to nationalism) as an expression of civic-minded commitment to the greater good is made in Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country* (Oxford, 1995). On the importance of articulating a critically patriotic, progressive understanding of national history in the United States, see Jill Lepore, *This America* (New York, 2019).

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agendas, as in Erin Hochman's eye-opening recent study of liberal-democratic and left-wing versions of Greater German nationalism in the Weimar Republic and interwar Austria.[28] To be sure, these were not the versions of nationalism that ultimately prevailed in interwar central Europe, but the fact that they were actively propagated for some years seems no less significant a counternarrative than the fact that many people in linguistic borderlands were reluctant to embrace unidimensional ethnonational identities in the late nineteenth-century Habsburg empire.

More broadly, it may prove analytically productive to take seriously the possibility that patriotic values could contribute to defining the parameters of the politically plausible (be it reactionary or progressive, intolerant or inclusive) under a given set of historical conditions. On the face of it, this may seem absurd. Presented, for instance, with the trajectory of France during the Second World War from widespread public acceptance of an armistice and partial German occupation in 1940 to rejection of the Vichy regime and embrace of Charles de Gaulle's Free French in 1944, all ostensibly in the name of patriotic values, one might conclude that patriotism was indeed nothing more than a set of empty symbols and phrases that could serve equally well as the packaging for radically opposed conceptions of the public good.[29] Yet an approach to patriotism and national identity that takes them seriously but understands them dynamically could actually serve to illuminate how the geopolitical and military conditions of 1940 served initially to cast Marshal Pétain in the light of a benevolently patriotic grandfather figure. It might also explain why the evolution of circumstances over subsequent years made what had originally looked like an unrealistically and self-destructively romantic conception of patriotism and national pride on de Gaulle's part much more compelling to a broad cross section of the public.

All this is not to suggest a wholesale retreat to a saccharine, nineteenth-century style historiographical cult of the nation. Taking the potential public resonance and substantive implications of nationhood and patriotism seriously does not mean thinking about them in ways that unreflectively internalize the very values and emotions under scrutiny. The methodological innovations of the past few decades of historical research into nationhood from a critical and skeptical perspective have provided the intellectual tools to explore the potential importance of ethnopolitical and patriotic concepts for ordinary people living in extraordinary times and for those who may have moved along the spectrum between the nationally indifferent and the nationally engaged.

28 Erin R. Hochman, *Imagining a Greater Germany* (Ithaca, 2016).

29 Matthew A. Kocher, Adria K. Lawrence, and Nuno P. Monteiro, "Nationalism, Collaboration, and Resistance," *International Security* 43.2 (2019).

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Sandrine Kott

Social States as Nation-States

In May 1944, Wolfgang Pohl, the director of the Nazi Labour Science Institute (Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut), organized a "social science conference" in Bad Salzbrunn. While reaffirming the superiority of the German social model, he aimed to strengthen a network of social experts who would promote international fascist social policies.[30] This short-lived undertaking did not lead to any concrete results but it is of interest here because Pohl's project represents a paroxysmal expression of the tensions between the national—even nationalistic—dimension of social policies and the international exchanges and knowledge building on which these same policies are based. In what follows, I wish to explore this tension and add the perspective of those who are either the beneficiaries of or excluded from this social policy.

Social policies have been presented by their initiators and felt by their beneficiaries as local and, increasingly in the wake of the nineteenth century, national realities.[31] For a long time, scholars have adopted this national perspective by studying social policies within the framework of a single nation or by comparing national solutions. Political scientists and sociologists have developed broad comparisons which led to the establishment of typologies and rankings between the different national social solutions or models.[32] These comparative studies are part of a long tradition carried out by social policy practitioners themselves who, from the second half of the nineteenth century, used comparisons to promote their own national model.[33] Meanwhile, these experts were eager to organize international congresses and engage in international associations to learn from others. National social measures and policies have largely been discussed and developed in interaction with each other.[34] This process has been carefully studied by scholars engaged in the transnational turn who wished to question the nationalist bias of most of their predecessors. Since the 1990s, these scholars have explored the reception, export, imitation, or, conversely, demarcation that presided over the implementation of social policies.[35] Do these highly fruitful approaches invalidate the long-prevailing national perspective?

Social policies were designed and developed in the wake of the constitution of nation-states and have been largely instrumentalized for nationalist purposes by various governments that derive significant legitimacy from it. The establishment of the first European system of compulsory workers' insurance in Germany offers a paradigmatic example of this. Following the example of French emperor Napoleon

30 "Organizational Conclusions from Negotiation Outcomes in Bad Salzbrunn," in *Sozialstrategien der Deutschen Arbeitsfront. Teil B: Periodika, Denkschriften, Gutachten und Veröffentlichungen des Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, Abteilung 2*, ed. Karl Heinz Roth, Michael Hepp, and Karsten Linne (1987).

31 Although this local level should not be neglected, the argumentation of this paper will be built on the dialectic between national and international levels.

32 For an overview of this research, see Bruno Palier, "Comparer les systèmes de protection sociale en Europe," *Revue Française des Affaires Sociales* 1 (2008). See also Flora Peter, ed., *Growth to Limits*, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1986–1987) and Flora Peter and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (London, 1981). See also the typology of Esping-Andersen Gøsta, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, 1990).

33 See, for example, the important work of a specialist in social policy in nineteenth-century Germany by Zacher Georg, *Die Arbeiter-Versicherung im Auslande*, 20 vols. (Berlin, 1898–1908).

34 On this question of knowledge sharing see the Nicola Miller's work in this forum.

35 Mitchell Allan, *The Divided Path* (Chapel Hill, 1991); Ernest Peter Hennock, *British Social Reform and German Precedents* (Oxford, 1987); Hennock Ernest Peter, *The Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914* (Cambridge, 2007). On a broader scale, see Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

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III, Otto von Bismarck sought to bind workers, whom he regarded as a fourth estate weakly connected to the new nation, by transforming them into a kind of "rentiers" of the state. Neither Napoleon III nor Bismarck succeeded in implementing their plans of large welfare programs directly administrated by the state; the administration of German workers insurance was extremely local. Nevertheless, Bismarck and the government of the new German Empire used the workers' social insurance laws passed in the 1880s as an instrument of nationalist propaganda. The three social insurances were represented organically as an oak tree linking employers, workers, and the state in the service of the same nation.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, German experts and politicians widely used the new social insurance system as a way to secure international recognition and influence that Germany, as a latecomer among European nations, was lacking. The first international conference on the legal protection of workers organized in Berlin at the call of William II in 1890 can be seen in this respect as the kickoff of its global policy (*Weltpolitik*). Books and pamphlets summarizing the results of social policy were distributed worldwide, while international exhibitions, especially the one in 1900, were the best places to assert the superiority of the German model. During the Weimar Republic, officials of the Ministry of Labour continued to represent the German social state as an international model.[36] In 1947, Andreas Grieser, former director of the Office of Social Insurance in the German Ministry of Labour during the Weimar period, was still declaring German social insurance as a "gift of the German people to the world."[37]

He purposely forgot how the Nazis—with the help of the German Ministry of Labour—used the German social state to set up a European system of forced labor and to exclude large parts of the German population from the *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community).[38] Indeed social rights integrate but they also exclude those who are not considered part of the national community. This was particularly the case for colonial subjects who were not covered by the labor laws valid in the metropolis or did not benefit from the same social insurance schemes. During the interwar period, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was dominated by the two colonial powers (France and Great Britain), and two provisions allowed these governments not to extend to workers in the colonies the benefits of the social conventions they had ratified. Even after World War II, despite eloquent proclamations, the social rights enjoyed by European workers were not fully offered to the colonized populations. Once again, international regulations were unable to challenge the power of national and imperial states.[39]

Nevertheless, the internationalization of national models has also served to improve the situations of a large part of the working population across national borders. At the end of the nineteenth century large sectors of the German workers movement were involved in the establishment and management of social insurance funds, which in return

36 Weimar Republic Ministry of Labour, *Deutsche Sozialpolitik 1918–1928 Erinnerungsschrift des Reichsarbeitsministeriums* (Berlin, 1929), 2.

37 Cited in Hans-Günter Hockerts, *Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Stuttgart, 1980), 48.

38 Sandrine Kott and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds., *Nazism across Borders* (Oxford, 2018).

39 Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization* (New York, 2012).

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was part of their influence and strength. Along this line, the 1904 International Socialist Congress of Amsterdam recognized the German legislation as a positive model for the international workers' movement.[40] German social experts were very active in constructing and promoting the "German model" as a way to sell their own expertise.[41] Both groups contributed decisively to the internationalization of the German social state model. Although German social experts were underrepresented in the staff of the International Labour Office, they were very active in several committees and, together with trade union representatives, contributed to the internationalization and later to the denationalization of the German social insurance model. This German example shows us both how national social knowledge can become internationalized and the role that international organizations have played—and still play—as sites of internationalization.[42]

Yet, not everybody was equally involved in this process of internationalization. During the interwar years Western European governments and experts dominated the international scene as exemplified by the discussion surrounding Convention 29, which sought to regulate the use of "native labour."[43] In 1930, this convention recommended the abolition of forced colonial labor, which should eventually be replaced by paid work. This implicitly put forward a vision for the reasonable, acceptable exploitation of dependent territories, trying therefore to stabilize the colonial project of Western European countries. A series of conventions and recommendations discussed and adopted between 1944 and 1947 further aimed to promote the social and economic development of "dependent territories." Nevertheless, appropriated by local elites, these early social development projects could also provide an argument in favor of demands for independence and the right to choose one's own path to modernity.[44] Just as the production of social knowledge amounts to more than simply the "product" of the functionaries of the ILO or other international organizations, its circulation results from more than a simple process of exportation. In order to circulate internationally, this knowledge needs to meet the interest of local social groups and be appropriated locally and nationally by these groups in a process of renationalization.[45]

The reality of these constant exchanges between the national scenes and the international organizations and networks does not prevent national actors from feeling threatened by what they considered to be uncontrolled global logics and processes—not without reason. Since the 1980s the neoliberal elites have elaborated and disseminated a discourse that calls into question international economic regulations and the validity of social protection and redistribution policies. This "globalist" discourse and its associated practices have significantly weakened the internationalist projects of the twentieth century, but in a context of growing deregulation it has also fed the mistrust of citizens toward international or European institutions that seemed to escape their control. This mistrust is partly based on the belief that these institutions

40 *Congres international socialiste d'Amsterdam (14–20 Août 1904)*, vol. 14 (Brussels, 1904), 134–35. *Congres international Socialiste, Copenhague, 1910* (Geneva, [1910] 1981), 481.

41 On this process, see Sandrine Kott, "Dynamiques de l'internationalisation," *Critique Internationale* 51 (2011).

42 Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013).

43 On this issue see Maul, *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization*; Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, *Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law* (Oxford, 2005), esp. 30–35; Susan Zimmermann, "'Special Circumstances in Geneva,'" in *ILO Histories*, ed. Magaly Rodriguez Garcia, G. Van Goethem, and Jasmien Van Daele (Bern, 2010); James P. Daughton, "ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Interwar Years," in *Globalizing Social Rights*, ed. Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (London, 2013).

44 On this see Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept," in *International Development and the Social Sciences*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Packard Randall (Berkeley, 1997).

45 On that issue also see Richard Drayton's contribution in this forum.

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are facilitating growing economic circulation without offering the social protection that people are hoping for. The nationalist discourse of recent decades, the Brexit campaign, which claimed that leaving the European Union would allow for the protection of the British National Health Service, is a direct emanation of this representation.

These ideas are widely shared: both nationalist extreme Right movements and part of the anticapitalist Left would support the claim that the nation remains the only valid protective framework for its citizens and that the national public authorities are the only effective social regulators. In reality, what could be considered a nationalist argument or representation has to be understood by exploring the actual functioning of the social state. Two levels of reality and two incarnations of the nation-state must be distinguished here. First, even if social legislation and measures are discussed internationally, legislation is discussed, voted on, and implemented nationally while most of the visible social redistribution programs are run by central or local governments. Second, and more importantly, social policies are powerful tools for nationalizing populations and strengthening the state. Since social legislation confers individual rights, it requires a careful registration of persons entitled to benefits, the development of specific administrative techniques, and the training of practical administrative skills. Until now this "government of the social" has been based on the identification and categorization of recipients, with all these techniques at the heart of the consolidation of the modern national state. With the expansion and diversification of social programs during the twentieth century, a greater part of the population is positively integrated into the nation and connected to the state through new administrative routines and personal identity documents. All of these have contributed since the nineteenth century to the nationalization of the society and have strengthened the loyalty to the state even if the state might not have been the only or even the principal actor in redistribution or protection. In the case of imperial Germany, social insurances were highly decentralized and the state contributed little, but despite this, it played the role of a distant but benevolent protector. At the end of the nineteenth century, the imperial eagle, as a political emblem and symbol of national unity, adorned some of the beneficiaries' personal documents, which were carefully kept in a drawer to prove their pension rights. This practice symbolizes the penetration of the central state into every working-class household in the empire. We could multiply such examples; they all underscore how, in people's daily lives, social policies have helped to establish a relationship of trust with the protective nation-state, a protection that nowadays large segments of the population fear to lose.

In reaffirming the importance of taking into account the national dimension of the social state, I do not want to deny the fruitfulness of transnational or international approaches. They made it possible to "denationalize" the so-called national social models, which are often based on an essentialization of the nation and feed a nationalist

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discourse. They also contribute to the identification and reevaluation of the role of international networks of experts and international associations and organizations in the design and development of social policies. Nevertheless, even international experts have been trained in national contexts. International conventions or recommendations are developed on the basis of national knowledge and implemented by national governments. Finally, despite or because of the globalization of labor and the multiplication of value chains, the nation is still largely perceived as a protective cocoon by those who need social protection. The transnational perspective is useful but it should not replace the careful exploration of concrete social policy implementation at the local and national levels. This dimension is important for understanding how the social state can be effectively—and wrongly—mobilized by nationalist leaders. These nationalist discourses are powerful not only because they create an imagined community but because the social state has profoundly contributed to building a material and concrete attachment to the nations and states as places and actors of social redistribution. This perspective from below is unavoidable for understanding the endurance of the nation as a social reality and as a central heuristic framework for social scientists. We should not leave the nation to nationalist propagandists.

Sebastian Conrad

Empire and Nationalism

In the European imagination of the nineteenth century, the world map was conveniently divided along nation-state/empire lines. There were the modern nation-states, mostly situated in Western Europe, that temporarily ruled over colonized territories, "civilizing" them and making them fit for eventual self-rule. In between there lingered the old empires: the Habsburgs, Ottomans, Romanovs, and the Qing. These were considered obsolete, a leftover from the past that would inevitably break up into smaller, coherent units. Running through this mental map of the world was the underlying opposition of empire and nation-state.

In unacknowledged ways, this dichotomy, a variant of the West versus rest binary, continues to haunt the historiography of nationalism to this day. It hides from view the crucial role of the active pursuit of imperialist politics in the making of nations. Specifically, it renders invisible the ways in which colonized countries could resort to imperialist ventures as a shortcut toward national sovereignty. Within established parameters, this "imperialism without a nation-state" could only appear as an anomaly. Ultimately, the received view veils the considerable overlap between empires and nation-states and their technologies of rule.

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In the historiography of Western nation-states, this collusion of imperialism and nationalism is now beginning to be recognized. It has started to replace the conventional narrative according to which the European nation-states formed internally, before then gradually reaching out. As German Social Democrat August Bebel summarized this evolutionary scheme in the 1870s, "the family became the clan; a combination of clans became the state and the nation, and finally, the close links between nations developed into internationality." Or, Bebel would soon add, imperialism. First the nation, then imperialist designs: "That is the historical process."[46] Echoing Bebel, John Darwin has identified among modern scholars three main schools of thought on the emergence of imperialism: expansion for economic reasons, as social imperialism to buy off discontented classes at home, and as a result of diplomatic rivalry. In all these readings, imperial expansion was subsequent to nation formation.[47] Within this grammar of consecutiveness, imperialism followed the formation of nations; it occurred when nations began to "overflow their natural banks," as J.A. Hobson phrased it during the heyday of high imperialism.[48]

We know from recent scholarship, however, that the sequence of nation-state first, imperialism second was not so straightforward. As historians have pointed out, European states, from Britain in the eighteenth century to Germany and Italy in the late nineteenth century, were forged into nation-states through their imperial projects.[49] In the twentieth century, "imperialism not only became an important goal for some nationalisms, it also became an important means of the formation of this nationalism." Nationalism and empire did not develop independently from each other. The incorporation of contiguous territories, imperial fantasies, and the seizure of overseas possessions all helped to make the modern nation.[50]

As a result of the global turn, then, the neat boundary between nation and empire has become blurry. This insight has not, however, been extended to studies of the colonized part of the world. Here, the conventional logic—empires and nation-states as polar opposites—remains firmly in place: only the end of empire created the space for postcolonial nation-states to emerge.

Indeed, the large majority of the independent nation-states on the map today is the product of a breakaway from empire. As a cursory glance at the four waves of nation-state formation commonly identified by historians reveals, they were all connected to the fall of major imperial formations: the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the 1810s; the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires in 1919; the European overseas empires after 1945; and the Soviet Union in 1991.[51]

While they lasted, the effect of empires on fledgling nationalist movements was two-pronged. On the one hand, in many places, imperialist oppression helped create a sense of shared nationhood. In many colonies, nationalism was a novel "invention of tradition," bridging ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional differences in the interest of aligning

46 August Bebel, *Für und wider die Commune* (Leipzig, 1876), 29.

47 John Darwin, "Nationalism and Imperialism, c. 1880–1940," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly (Oxford, 2013)

48 J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (New York, 1902), 4.

49 Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, 2009); Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies* (Cambridge, 1997); Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2010); Mark I. Choate, *Emigrant Nation* (Cambridge, MA, 2008).

50 Prasenjit Duara, "The Imperialism of 'Free Nations,'" in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue (Santa Fe, 2007), 217.

51 Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein, "The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001," *American Sociological Review* 75 (2010). On the Ottoman case, see also the contribution by Cemil Aydin in this forum.

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against foreign rule. Here, nationalism was born as anticolonial activism, as a response to the suffering that imperialism wrought. Moreover, empires were catalysts also in a more positive sense: not infrequently, anticolonialism was itself enabled by imperial institutions and infrastructures that facilitated communication and exchange. Not least, imperial centers themselves served as hubs for the generation of anticolonial nationalism.[52]

While thus engendering nationalism, empires were primarily obstacles to be overcome. For anticolonial nationalism to flourish, and for postcolonial states to gain sovereignty, empires had to fall. In the cosmology of nationalist pressure groups, empires stood in the way of the seemingly natural emergence of nation-states. Ironically, this belief was also at the heart of imperial ideology itself, as the civilizing mission foresaw a gradual withering of empires. Even if it would take a long time—Gotō Shinpei, the chief architect of the Japanese Empire, spoke of a "hundred-year plan" for Taiwan; Nitobe Inazō, a professor of law and expert on colonial matters, calculated eight hundred years before Korea was fit for independence—the most noble goal of empire, in the eyes of its protagonists, was to prepare the colonized for self-rule.[53]

A catalyst and an obstacle: both patterns presupposed imperial victimization and a struggle against imperial rule. But the relationship between anticolonial nationalism and imperialism was more complex. What is occluded from the conventional picture is the degree to which imperial expansion—not only resistance *against* empire—could be at the heart, indeed at the origin, of the quest for national independence. As recently emerging scholarship has begun to demonstrate, in a number of important cases, imperial ventures preceded national sovereignty and were an important ingredient in attempts to drum up support for the national cause. Even in the colonized world, imperialism could be a veritable cradle of the nation-state.

Japan is a case in point. It is a complex case because Japan, a coherent state for many centuries, was an imperial power itself.[54] But this is not the whole story. The new and fledgling Japanese nation was highly precarious. Culturally and also politically, Japan was subjected to Western hegemony, and historians have therefore spoken of the "colonial consciousness" of Meiji Japan, the widespread feeling that the Japanese were forced to adapt to foreign ways.[55] The country was subjected to a set of "unequal treaties," severely curbing national sovereignty, very similar to what happened in Korea or the Ottoman Empire. In the minds of the early Meiji oligarchy, the threat of being subjected to foreign rule was therefore never far away.

In this context, a closer look at Meiji Japan's early forays into neighboring East Asia is useful. The textbook version of Japanese colonialism begins in 1895 with the conquest of Taiwan. But Japanese expansion began much earlier. The settlement of Hokkaido after 1869 and the annexation of the Ryukyu Islands (present-day Okinawa) a decade later can be considered Japan's first colonial projects.[56] Even more instructive

52 Anne Boittin, *Colonial Metropolis* (Lincoln, NE, 2010); Noor-Aiman I. Khan, *Egyptian-Indian Nationalist Collaboration and the British Empire* (New York, 2011); Marc Matera, *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, 2015); Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis* (Cambridge, 2015).

53 Quoted in Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism, 1895–1945," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, 1984), 95.

54 For overviews of the Japanese colonial empire, see W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945* (Oxford, 1987); Iwanami Kōza, *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, 8 vols. (Tokyo, 1992–1993).

55 Komori Yōichi, *Posuto koroniaru* (Tokyo, 2001); Katō Yûzō, *Kurofune zengo no sekai* (Tokyo, 1985).

56 Michele M. Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan* (New York, 2012); Katsuo Inoue, *Meiji Nihon no shokumin shihai* (Tokyo, 2013).

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is the expedition sent to Taiwan in 1874 under the pretext of punishing local aborigines for killing fishermen from the Ryukyu Islands. The express—if publicly unacknowledged—aim behind the expedition was to colonize the island. The reasoning: under the premises of international law, the abolition of the "unequal treaties" and the achievement of full sovereignty was conditioned on Japan's status as a "civilized nation." The Meiji oligarchy saw the ability to conquer and civilize others as the most efficient way to demonstrate the nation's own civilized status—imperialism as an alternative route to treaty revision.[57] This plan failed, thwarted by foreign pressure. But the logic remained firmly in place. In 1876, Japan forcibly "opened" Korea, thus replicating the "civilizing" operation it had itself been subjected to in 1853. Japan's full sovereignty was achieved in 1899—not coincidentally on the heels of Japan's acquisition of its first proper, formal colony in 1895.[58]

Was Japan an exception, the odd one out? It was certainly not the norm, but neither was it an anomaly. Take the example of Egypt. Formally still under Ottoman rule, beginning in 1882, Cairo was, for all practical purposes, a British colony. This did not preclude Egyptian journalists, political activists, and government officials from pursuing imperialist politics of their own. Looking to ancient Egypt, intellectuals detected the origins of imperial expansion in the time of the Pharaohs. Already back then, nationalist Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid declared, "the Egyptians formed an important expansionist nation, proceeding in its empire along the most modern lines of European colonialism today."[59] The quest for empire did not remain limited to words. An aggressive strategy to colonize the Sudan was a crucial ingredient of Egypt's self-fashioning as an independent nation. "The Sudan is … a part of what makes up Egypt," declared Lutfi. "She completes Egypt." Civilizing the southern neighbors was part and parcel of Egypt's anti-imperialist nationalism.[60]

South Asia provides another example of nationalists seeking to cash in on the status as a colonized-colonizer, in their attempts to wrestle power away from the British overlords. In the interwar period, intellectuals such as Rabindranath Tagore embraced the discourse of Greater India, a vision of (Hindu) Indian expansion into Southeast Asia and beyond. For the most part, this was less a recipe for territorial acquisition than a rhetorical strategy to mobilize India's glorious past and its cultural influence in the region. As Yorim Spoelder remarks, "the notion of 'Indian colonizers' … involved ascribing a superior and premeditated form of 'national' agency to Buddhist monks, merchants, brahmins or warriors." Emphasizing the "peaceful conquest" of Southeast Asia by Hindu religion, Indian art, and the "Sanskrit Cosmopolis," nationalists could imagine themselves as colonizers in their own right. An influential strand of Indian nationalism, partly feeding into Hindutva thinking that ideologically sustains the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) today, emerged from the imperialist designs originally directed against British rule.[61]

57 Robert Eskildsen, *Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia* (New York, 2019). On the role of the concept of "civilization" in international law, see Marti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations* (Cambridge, 2001).

58 On the "unequal treaties" and treaty revision, see Michael R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism* (Cambridge, MA, 2009); Iokibe Kaoru, *Jōyaku kaiseishi* (Tokyo, 2010).

59 Quoted in Elliot Colla, *Conflicted Antiquities* (Durham, 2007), 148.

60 Eve M. Troutt Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism* (Berkeley, 2003), 166. See also Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs* (Oxford, 1989); Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians* (Stanford, 2011).

61 Yorim Spoelder, "Staging the Nation Beyond the Raj" (PhD diss., Free University of Berlin, 2020), 31. See also Susan Bayly, "Imagining 'Greater,'" *Modern Asian Studies* 38.3 (2004); Carolien Stolte and Harald Fischer-Tiné, "Imagining Asia in India," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54.1 (2012).

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While the colonizing/civilizing claims of the Greater India discourse lay largely in the past, Polish nationalists sought to actively create an overseas empire in their attempt to secure national independence. In the wake of the Partitions in the late eighteenth century, Poland disappeared from the map as a sovereign state for more than a century. While being treated as a quasicolonial space by the occupying powers Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary,[62] Polish nationalists bought into the imperialist logic of the times in order to establish the Polish nation as a colonizing power in its own right. Through a host of activities that included ethnographic expeditions, colonial exhibitions, novels, and popular culture, the Polish nation was presented as a civilizing force that, as a result, merited a nation-state of its own.[63]

Some of these ventures were quite spectacular. The geographer and national activist Stefan Szolc-Rogoziński (1861–96) was among those who attempted to make a case for independence via the imperialist detour. As an explorer, he participated in a Russian expedition to Africa and was the first European to chart the Mungo River in Cameroon. As an activist, he tried to stake out Polish claims during the "scramble for Africa" in the early 1880s. He collaborated with the British Empire, bought up land, and hoisted the Polish flag in his quest to create an African colony to serve as a proxy for, and in anticipation of, Polish independence.[64]

Thadée Gasztowtt (1881–1936), who grew up in exile in Paris, sought the protection of the Ottoman Empire for his strategies to resuscitate an independent Polish state. Deriving from the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 the lesson that national sovereignty could only be achieved in the guise of an imperialist project, Gasztowtt campaigned for an alliance between Muslims and Slavs to secure Polish sovereignty in a struggle against Russian, Prussian, and Habsburg hegemony. After converting to Islam, Gasztowtt, the fervent supporter of Pan-Islamism, courted the Ottoman sultan in his grand scheme of anti-imperialist imperialism, all in the service of a nation in the state of the not yet.[65]

As these examples show, the customary dichotomy of Western nation-states acquiring an empire, and colonized societies struggling against it, does not hold. Quite to the contrary, embarking on imperialist ventures of their own was seen by some nationalist activists as the preferred path to national independence. This is not to say, of course, that such anticolonial imperialism should be seen as the new normal. Given the geopolitical hierarchies in place, it was an option that was only available in rare cases. But the examples described earlier show how processes of nation formation were, each in their different ways, deeply imbricated with the logic and technologies of empire, even when ostensibly militating against it.[66] In the social Darwinist climate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, civilized status—the prerequisite of equality in international law—was most effectively demonstrated by subduing and "civilizing" others. As a result, pitting imperialism against nationalism, an opposition rendered tenuous by

62 Robert L. Nelson, *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East* (New York, 2009); Kristin Kopp, *Germany's Wild East* (Ann Arbor, 2012); Sebastian Conrad, "Internal Colonialism in Germany," in *German Colonialism in a Global Age*, ed. Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley (Durham, 2014); Dörte Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume* (Frankfurt, 2016).

63 Most studies on Polish colonial initiatives have focused on the interwar years, and thus on the period after Polish independence. See Piotr Puchalski, "The Polish Mission to Liberia, 1934–1938," *Historical Journal* 60.4 (2017); Marta Grzechnik, "'Ad Maiorem Poloniae Gloriam!' Polish Inter-colonial Encounters in Africa in the Interwar Period," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 48.5 (2020).

64 Maria Rhode, "Zivilisierungsmissionen und Wissenschaft," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 39.1 (2013); Lenny A. Ureña Valerio, *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities* (Athens, OH, 2019).

65 Paulina Dominik, "'For Our Freedom and Yours'" (PhD diss., Free University of Berlin, 2021).

66 For interactions and overlap between nationalism and empire, see Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford, 2004); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History* (Princeton, 2011); Krishan Kumar, "Nation-States as Empires, Empires as Nation-States," *Theory and Society* 39.2 (2010). See also the contribution by Frederick Cooper in this forum.

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recent research, becomes increasingly problematic. In practice, historical actors adapted their political strategies and technologies of rule by reacting to shifting contexts, not by adhering to a political science textbook. Subaltern imperialism, in this way, could be mobilized as a tool, and as a shortcut, to nationhood.

Grace Ballor

Europe between Nationalism and Neoliberalism

Transnational, international, multinational, supranational. The lexicon of European integration wrestles with the same Westphalian "nation-state paradigm" that has fragmented so much modern European historiography.[67] For three generations, scholars have debated which scalar and methodological frameworks best explain the geometry of the region between nation and globe. Early scholarship echoed the ambitions of the federalist architects with a teleology of nations beyond nationalism; later works argued that cooperation actually strengthened and reified the nation-state. Amid the academy's "global turn," a new cohort moved beyond the state to consider the European Union (EU) and its predecessors amid the globalization of both markets and market-oriented policies designed to buttress boundaryless trade. The events of the twenty-first century—from compounded crises to Britain's exit from the EU—have only intensified debates about the intransience of the nation, the future of interdependence in the region, and Europe's place in a globalized world, demanding: How can we understand the history and historiography of contemporary Europe between nationalism and neoliberalism?

The Whig history of European integration was first articulated during the postwar proliferation of internationalisms,[68] not by historians, but by politicians and political scientists who envisioned for the continent a future beyond nation-states.[69] If the years of conflict from 1918 to 1945 were British historian Eric Hobsbawm's "apogee of nationalism," then postwar cooperation would be its redemption, hoped the authors of the Ventotene Manifesto in 1941 and the Schuman Declaration in 1950.[70] Bolstered by the Coal and Steel Community's answer to the German question, regional economic cooperation aimed to achieve not "coalitions between states, but union among people," in the words of Jean Monnet.[71] Political scientist Ernst Haas interpreted the subsequent creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 as proof

67 Wolfram Kaiser, "From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration," in *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (London, 2006).

68 Kiran Klaus Patel, *Project Europe* (Cambridge, 2020); Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., *Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History* (Cambridge, 2016).

69 Several leading historians have described the dominance of progressive narratives of European integration history driven by political scientists a "crisis" for the field. See Mark Gilbert, "Narrating the Process," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46.3 (2008). Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol also problematized the disciplinary divides in integration scholarship in "Rich, Vivid, and Ignored," *Politique européenne* 50 (2015).

72 Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1990).

71 Jean Monnet, *Memoires* (Paris, 1976).

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that cooperation in some areas would inevitably "spill over" into others; with this neofunctionalist view and against the groundswell of "miracle" growth rates across Western Europe, full social and political unification seemed just a few steps away.[72] Meanwhile, the architects of the first supranational institutions deployed many of the classic techniques of nation-building: translation services may have taken precedence over Bismarckian linguistic homogeneity, but common flags, anthems, expositions, and institutions became mechanisms for cultivating an "imagined [European] Community" (EC), fulfilling the vision of the early federalist movements historian Walter Lipgens traced throughout the region.[73]

Alongside this Eurocentric narrative of inevitable post-nation progress developed a second set of interpretations. By the mid-1960s, Haas's supranational neofunctionalism had met its match in the persistence of state power. At worst, French President Charles de Gaulle's "empty chair crisis" and veto of Britain's application for EC membership proved that sovereignty could be flexed anew in the international arena.[74] At best, cooperation launched a Westphalia 2.0, equipping countries with the institutional means and international frameworks to manage the challenges of a world after war, and then, after empire, as the EC and its members renegotiated relationships with the decolonized world.[75] In the postcolonial dialectic of nation versus community, political scientist Stanley Hoffmann so convincingly inverted Haas's arguments with his intergovernmentalist theory of nation-state agency that even Haas revoked neofunctionalism.[76] British historian Alan Milward later coupled Hoffmann's approach with his own assertions that integration in the 1940s and 1950s had actually "rescued the nation state"—not only restoring it after its wartime defeat, but also empowering it to meet the postwar demands for more robust welfare programs.[77] Then, the crises of the 1970s brought an end to the *trente glorieuses* that had so perfectly contrasted the preceding economic epoch. Stagnation became stagflation became "Europessimism" and "Eurosclerosis," all of which seemingly confirmed Hoffmann's assessment: cooperation was contingent on the collective will of member states. This period of the 1970s did not mark a reversal of regional cooperation, but rather a shift in its objectives, especially as global capitalism and its policy scaffolding evolved.[78]

By the 1980s, globalization changed integration calculus. Japanese manufacturers increasingly outperformed their American and European counterparts, technological innovations in production and shipping fueled export economies, and financialization and deregulation hastened the rise of multinational corporations. Economic growth had become peacetime warfare, with "national champion" enterprises the weapons of choice. Finding little recourse at the state level, many European companies looked to Brussels for support. Between the liberal frameworks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the economic nationalism of some state governments, European officials

72 Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Notre Dame, IN, 1958).

73 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (New York, 2016); Walter Lipgens, *A History of European Integration, 1945–1947* (Oxford, 1982).

74 For more on the ways national governments in Britain and France have related to the EEC and EU, see the rich archival work of N. Piers Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain* (Cambridge, 1997); Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s* (London, 2006).

75 For more on the relationship of integration to decolonization, see Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires* (Oxford, 2012).

76 Stanley Hoffmann, *The European Sisyphus* (Nashville, 1995). Other neofunctionalists such as Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet, and Neil Fligstein have since corrected some of the problems in Haas's interpretations and reinvigorated the theory.

77 Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (London, 1992).

78 Laurent Warlouzet, "The Interdisciplinary Challenge in European Integration History," *Journal of Contemporary History* 49.4 (2014); Warlouzet, "European Integration History," *Politique européenne* 44.2 (2014). Here, Warlouzet weaves together an assessment of the challenges for the discipline of integration history with the "crisis narrative" articulated by those such as Jean Monnet. See Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money* (Ithaca, 2012).

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increasingly saw regional cooperation and coordinated liberalism as a last, best defense against global competition. In 1985, the European Commission resolved to complete an internal market by 1992, and the Single European Act of 1986 prepared the community for its institutional evolution into the EU. Observing this, political scientist Andrew Moravcsik read back a new version of Hoffmann's intergovernmentalism into the histories of the "stall" and crises, and of the "relaunch" and reunification: economic interests drove national preferences toward integration, achieved through "grand bargains" and guaranteed by supranational institutions.[79] Although not without its detractors, his liberal intergovernmentalism became a leading paradigm to explain the ways national governments, as primary actors, pursued greater economic and monetary cooperation.

In the midst of the Single Market Program, the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet Bloc collapsed, and Eastern Europe opened to the outside world for the first time in decades. If this was not Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," was it at least the "end of an era" for Europe, questioned historian Antonio Varsori.[80] Or did 1989 mark the beginning of a new but troubled phase of liberalism in the region?[81] Hopes were high for a quick transition to democracy and capitalism—and membership in the new EU—for former Bloc states, but reality proved far more difficult. This moment divided scholars between what Frederick Cooper called the "conceptual gold rush of globalization" on the one hand, and the challenge of analyzing the "making and breaking of nations" like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the other, to quote Tony Judt.[82] Historians of integration approached the tension between the global turn and the resurgence of nationalist histories by conceptualizing Europe as a liminal space in between. In creating the *Journal of European Integration History* in 1995 and establishing a professionalized field of study, they found a forum in which to analyze the nonlinear path toward union and examine the diversity of national perspectives on Europe from both sides of the Iron Curtain.[83]

As the EU evolved and enlarged, the methodological frameworks of integration history increasingly moved beyond nation-states. Some scholars embraced historical institutionalism by analyzing the formation and function of the European Parliament, Commission, and Court of Justice and cataloging the "economic milieu" in and around Brussels.[84] Others focused on the cultural, social, and labor movements that reacted to and participated in regional cooperation.[85] Turning their attention to the corporations and business groups whose market power enabled them to "set the agenda" for the European Single Market in "transnational capitalism's struggle over European integration," another multidisciplinary set dismantled the narrative monopoly of nation-states and highlighted the influence of capital in making Europe.[86] With these new approaches, the field embraced the "compelling narrative" of globalization and moved beyond the "territorial trap" by trading the narrow analytical lens of the nation-state for the wider

79 Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe* (Ithaca, 1998).

80 Antonio Varsori, ed., *Europe, 1945–1990s* (London, 1995).

81 Philipp Ther, *Europe since 1989* (Princeton, 2016).

82 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005), 637.

83 Wilfried Loth, "Explaining European Integration," *Journal of European Integration History* 14.1 (2008). See also Angela Romano and Federico Romero, *European Socialist Regimes' Fateful Engagement with the West* (London, 2020). On the motivations of post-Soviet republics to pursue European trade agreements, see Rawi Abdelal, *National Purpose in the World Economy* (Ithaca, 2001).

84 Paul Pierson outlined this approach in his "The Path to European Integration," *Comparative Political Studies* 29.2 (1996). See also Éric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann, *Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XXe siècle* (Paris, 2008).

85 For a representative work, see Wolfram Kaiser, "Bringing People and Ideas Back In," in *Reflections on European Integration*, ed. David Phinnemore and Alex Warleigh-Lack (2009).

86 Neil Rollings, *British Business in the Formative Years of European Integration, 1945–1973* (New York, 2007); Rollings and Matthias Kipping, "Private Transnational Governance in the Heyday of the Nation State," *Economic History Review* 61.2 (2008). See also Maria Green Cowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33.4 (1995); Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration* (Abingdon, 2002).

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and more nuanced perspectives of transnational actors.[87] A group of leading historians collectively argued that through such multidimensional approaches, scholars could attend to both national and global developments and more faithfully reconstruct the complex and multifaceted history of European cooperation.[88]

The protracted economic, financial, sovereign debt, refugee, and security crises of the early twenty-first century added urgency to the academy's global turn and pushed the boundaries of integration scholarship from the nation to the region to the globe. In this shift, historians worked to "provincialize Europe" with new research agendas rethinking regional integration in the context of globalization, capitalism, and the neoliberalism that had governed much of the twentieth century.[89] Quinn Slobodian's excavation of the economic and political thought of Wilhelm Röpke and his interlocutors recast the early EEC in the light of "ordo-globalism"; for the coterie of tweeded economists designing worlds from places such as Freiburg and Mont Pèlerin in the aftermath of war, regional cooperation belonged to the universal effort to encase markets in liberal institutions, resulting in factions of neoliberals for and against the European project.[90] Examining Europe's response to the "shock of the global" in the 1970s and 1980s, Laurent Warlouzet found that the diversity of national approaches to economic governance in Europe offered the community several alternatives to neoliberalism, including neomercantilism and frameworks for a social market economy, equally influenced by French dirigism as German ordoliberalism.[91] Such scholarship reframed regional cooperation in a matrix of national, regional, and global dimensions and problematized linear narratives of both integration and globalization.

Debates about the relationship between nationalism and supranationalism, nation, and integration came to a head in the wake of Britain's 2016 decision to leave the EU. To many observers, it seemed that the mantra of "Britain first" had suddenly shattered the presumed teleology of "ever closer union."[92] In the aftermath, analysts and scholars redoubled their efforts to explain what appeared by then a global phenomenon of nationalist resurgence. Had the national retained primacy over the supranational all along, or had the circumstances of the twenty-first century produced a new and different defensive ethos? While Britain's inward turn must be understood through evolutions in its electoral politics and in the context of the UK's "inside-outside" status since joining the bloc in 1973 and first membership referendum in 1975, the watershed of Brexit and the rise of nationalist groups in other member states brought nationalism roaring back into the integration discourse. Two departmental colleagues set up camps on either side of the analytical divide: Marxist historian Perry Anderson deployed his incisive critical theory in a series of Eurosceptic essays published by the *London Review of Books*,[93] while economic historian Ivan Berend found the origins of inequality not in interdependence, but in path dependence and technological change, countering critiques of the neoliberal "austerity

87 Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York, 2014). John Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD, 2018).

88 Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori, *European Union History* (London, 2010).

89 Éric Bussière, "Régionalism européen et mondialisation," *Les Cahiers IRICE*, no. 9 (2012); Aurélie Andry, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, Haakon A. Ikonomou, and Quentin Jouan, "Rethinking European Integration History in Light of Capitalism," *European Review of History* 26.4 (2019).

90 See Quinn Slobodian's many works, including *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA, 2018); Slobodian, "Colossus Wears Tweed," *Dissent* (Winter 2020); Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe, "Neoliberals against Europe," in *Mutant Neoliberalism*, ed. William Callison and Zachary Manfredi (New York, 2019).

91 See Laurent Warlouzet's works, including *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World* (Abindgon, 2018); Warlouzet, "The EEC/EU as an Evolving Compromise between French Dirigism and German Ordoliberalism (1957–1995)," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 57.1 (2019); Warlouzet, "The Implementation of the Single Market Programme (1985–1992)," in *Reshaping Europe*, ed. Michael Gehler and Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden, 2020); and Warlouzet, *Europe contre Europe* (Paris, 2022).

92 This language appears in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries to create the EEC alongside EURATOM.

93 Perry Anderson, "The European Coup," December 17, 2020; Anderson, "Ever Closer Union," January 7, 2021; Anderson, "The Breakaway," January 21, 2021. Anderson published a related monograph, *Ever Closer Union? Europe in the West* (New York, 2021).

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machine" with a litany of European structural assistance programs and their achievements.[94] Despite their disagreements, both authors argued that "Europe and its discontents" must be understood by situating national and regional contingencies in global perspective.[95]

Undoubtedly, Britain's exit from the EU and the challenges of the COVID-19 global pandemic will inspire new waves of scholarship on Europe and its nation-states, internationalism, and global capitalism. Similarly, the rise of populists in the region requires renewed focus on the historical contours of collective economic policies and their beneficiaries, on the changing relationships between nation-states and citizens, and on the social balance sheets of globalization and neoliberalism. These developments are already motivating reform-driven research on democracy, inequality, growth, and sustainability in the region, as are the evolving responses of European institutions, further compromises, and sometimes conflicts between social and market policies. As a result, writing the history of contemporary Europe in the twenty-first century demands multidimensional research agendas that attend to national interests as well as to global pressures, draw on multidisciplinary methods to analyze a diversity of national, transnational, and global actors, and reject the teleology of a linear "integration process" for an engagement with the complexities, achievements, and failures of regional cooperation.

Pieter M. Judson

Is Nationalism the New Imperialism?

Writing this essay, I am keenly aware of the renewed role that political nationalism has come to play in government supported histories and public projects in the central and Eastern European regions whose histories I research. Readers of the *AHR* will doubtless know all about the political dynamics in Hungary that resulted in the expulsion of the Central European University from Budapest. They may not, however, be as aware of the parallel initiatives taken by the regime to control and shape the professional writing of history. For some years now the Orban government has used fiscal policy to starve some of Hungary's most respected institutions of historical research, such as the Institute of Political History and the Hungarian Academy of the Sciences. At the same time the regime lavishes funds on newly founded institutions staffed with cronies who, along with well-paid visiting fellows, can be counted on to produce the kind of historical narratives about Hungary and Europe that the regime demands.[96] In Slovenia, the coalition

94 Ivan T. Berend, *Economic History of a Divided Europe* (Abingdon, 2020); Berend, *Against European Integration* (Abingdon, 2019).

95 Berend, *Against European Integration.*

96 Ferencz Laczó, "Totalitarianism without Perpetrators," in *Brave New Hungary*, ed. János Mátyás Kovács and Balázs Trencsényi (Lanham, MD, 2019); Bea Tóth, "Elköltöztetett történelem hazugságokkal, lejárató kampányokkal és einstandokkal" [With Smear Campaigns, and a Debut], *Jelen*, February 20, 2008.

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government of right-wing populist Janez Janša recently announced plans to build a museum of independence that will offer an unapologetically nationalistic picture of the region's history. At the same time, Janša installed men with questionable qualifications in museum directorships that until now had been held by professionals with significant international reputations.[97] For many years Poland's government has promoted a particular vision of the country's history by attempting to outlaw alternative narratives either in museums or in publications.[98] In Austria, in a more complex situation, governments debated and eventually funded the establishment of a House of Austrian History, only to undermine the project once it became clear that the narratives professional historians had developed to contextualize the displays might not be congenial to the national images the government wished to promote.[99]

These examples are egregious, but certainly not the only instances of overt governmental efforts to rewrite the historical narratives of European states and societies in order to promote a more nationalistic point of view. They demonstrate the remarkable degree to which historians these days are often expected to serve on the front lines of official efforts to revive a militant and often racially based political nationalism that a decade or two ago would have seemed unimaginable. Those brave individuals and institutions who withhold their participation from these projects often lose the state funding on which their work depends. Those willing to serve are showered with an embarrassment of resources.

Historians who work to denationalize the very foundations of their profession today—a profession still largely organized according to national schools—face daunting, if not familiar challenges. Since the nineteenth century in central and Eastern Europe, historians have driven the creation of popular nationalist movements. Their activist roles often lent their field political status and prestige. Historians from the authoritative František Palacký (1798–1876) to the likes of Franjo Tudjman (1922–99) led political movements that aimed to create national communities based not on social distinctions, but increasingly by 1900 on radical claims of cultural and even racial difference. Historians' work legitimated the political and territorial claims of the self-styled nation-states that emerged from the ruins of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, and Romanov empires. Indeed, today's nationalist politicians continue to cite the opinions of those earlier historians, treating their writings and their political activism as if they expressed timeless and organic interests of their national communities. Less discussed, however, are the ways that many of these same historians frequently promoted highly imperialist versions of nationhood. They had learned these, in part, from their experience under empire. In the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, for example, a constitution and the courts increasingly granted rights of autonomy to groups that successfully claimed the status of "nation" for themselves, based on their linguistic distinctiveness.

97 Alex Marshall, "A Populist Leader Kicks Off a Culture War, Starting in Museums," *New York Times*, January 27, 2021.

98 For the most recent example of the Polish government's efforts to silence historians, see Andrew Higgins, "Polish Court Orders Scholars to Apologize over Holocaust Study," *New York Times*, February 9, 2021. See also Jan Grabowski, "The New Wave of Holocaust Revisionism," *New York Times*, January 29, 2022.

99 Heidemarie Uhl, "Die Undarstellbarkeit von Geschichte und die Notwendigkeit des Hauses der Geschichte Österreich," in *Haus? Geschichte? Österreich? Ergebnisse einer Enquete über das neue historische Museum in Wien*, ed. Thomas Winkelbauer (Vienna, 2016). In the United States, in an effort to leave its imprint on the historical narrative, the Trump administration in 2020 sought to counter the work of the 1619 project on the history of slavery with a governmental "1776 Commission." This commission, since terminated by the Biden administration, sought to advance a "patriotic education" that would combat the claims of systemic racism in the United States provided by the 1619 project. Michael Crowley and Jennifer Schuessler, "Trump's 1776 Commission Critiques Liberalism in Report Derided by Historians," *New York Times*, January 18, 2021.

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However, the same nationalists also used history to differentiate their linguistic communities from neighboring communities even further. After 1918, radical claims of difference increasingly underwrote assertions of each nation's civilizational and even racial superiority vis-à-vis both its neighbors and the apparently unassimilable national minority populations within its own borders. Under this imperialist form of nationalism, those minorities become increasingly marginalized, colonized, and rendered invisible in national histories.

Today's nationalist political regimes continue to place their resources behind similar and long-discredited histories of nationhood in order to promote imperialist visions in at least two familiar ways. Focused inward, the emphasis on a nation's racial or religious superiority continues to hide the complex historical relations among the many linguistic, religious, social, and cultural groups in the region. The universalizing nation claims to encompass all of society, so it denies the very existence of groups that may not share the necessary characteristics for belonging. Among other policy implications, this kind of history facilitates the blanket rejections of immigration we have witnessed in the region in the past decade. It also defines and rejects as insurmountably different groups with long-standing historical roots in the region from the Roma to Jews and Muslims. The legal requirement that the history of a state or nation has to be written in a way that flatters one dominant group necessarily produces a colonial relationship with those who are defined out of the nation but are present in society. Focused outward, this kind of nationalism can reject whatever political values it opposes by labeling them as foreign (in this case often as too "Western" and "permissive"). This outwardly projected claim of civilizational superiority fosters a kind of irredentist resentment toward neighboring states even though, as in the case of Hungary, the state has no intention or ability to pursue a territorially expansionist policy. In fact, an aspirational nationalism with barely veiled imperialist undertones remains all too present in many European self-styled nation-states, from Spain to Ukraine, from Italy to Britain. Nor should it surprise us that aspirational nationalism as a popular political phenomenon has repeatedly failed to die out, merely because nationalists attained many of their historic territorial or population goals. Quite the contrary. As many historians of Habsburg Central Europe have correctly argued over the past decades, a common dynamic fundamental to political nationalism is precisely its inability to attain satiety.[100] The nation is never whole, the nation-state is never fully realized. Stubborn linguistic minorities persist, immigrant populations arrive and do not appear willing to assimilate to the nation, and members of the nation remain "trapped" in neighboring states as national minorities. If the nation-state is a chimera never to be attained, then despite their ideological claims to the contrary, we ought to recognize the degree to which nation-states, like empires, are often driven by simultaneous logics of expansion as well as of purification.

100 Most recently, Edin Hadarpasic, *Whose Bosnia? Nationalism and Political Imagination in the Balkans, 1840–1914* (Ithaca, 2015).

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It is worth recalling that today's efforts to control historical narrative in order to revitalize nationalism would have seemed unimaginable twenty or even ten years ago, when even popular histories became increasingly transnational and global in character. And at least within the historical profession, the influence of transnational and global approaches and the particular questions they pose has not diminished in recent years. If anything, they have increased their intellectual purchase among professional historians internationally, and especially among those who study central and Eastern Europe. A survey of professional journals, university curricula, and dissertation topics would confirm that these approaches continue to produce challenging debates, methodological innovation, and healthy disagreement as to their meaning. This divergence between the profession and the demands of political regimes also makes today's historians into appetizing targets for cultural attacks by nationalist politicians. But nationalist politicians don't limit their efforts to personalized attacks. As mentioned above, by appointing them to prestigious positions, by endowing new institutions for their benefit, governments also raise the profiles of otherwise marginalized purveyors of long-debunked myths who are more than willing to underwrite government-sponsored histories.[101]

For the past century, historians in my own field, Habsburg Central Europe (the Habsburg state and its successors), have faced multiple obstacles to writing histories both of empire and of its aftermath. Histories of empire must by their very nature be transnational or even global in character. Invariably, however, this impulse comes up against the methodological nationalism that has shaped history writing of the region, thanks in part to the ways that the successor states divided and reorganized library and archival collections according to new national borders. Nation-state sponsored histories made racially defined nations—rather than empires, regions, economic networks, or even society itself—into the key building blocks of the region's history. And then, of course, there is no Habsburg state today interested in funding transnational historical research into its own history.[102] Nevertheless, professional practitioners of economic and political history, regional and local history, social and cultural history, or the histories of science, mobility, gender, or emotions, have effectively displaced the nation as a prime subject of their histories.[103] Today professional historians are less likely to reject imperial pasts outright for nationalist reasons, or to treat empire as something alien to the region, and thereby deny their societies' historical engagement at every level with empire.[104] National and transnational impulses can even work together at times. On a banal level, for example, the demands of a rapidly expanding tourism business in east central Europe after 1989 produced a veritable industry dedicated to the production of mythical imperial pasts to serve as colorful backdrops to the lives of popular national figures. At the level of scholarship, historians today often emphasize the complex ways that concepts of empire and nation developed in tandem with each other

101 Many historians of the region who signed a petition in 2020 to condemn the Janša government's actions with regard to Slovene museum personnel, for example, received emails explaining that as foreigners ignorant of conditions in Slovenia, we had unwittingly supported an effort subversive to the Slovene national interest.

102 In the past, the Austrian and Hungarian Academies of Science, for example, often collaborated on such research quite generously as it accorded with their national priorities.

103 An exhaustive list of these works would cover several pages. Suffice it here to mention Deborah Coen, *Climate in Motion* (Chicago, 2018); Andrea Komlosy, *Grenze und ungleiche regionale Entwicklung* (Vienna, 2003); Jan Surman, *Universities in Imperial Austria, 1848–1918* (West Lafayette, IN, 2018); Tara Zahra, *The Great Departure* (New York, 2016).

104 Two important recent works that nevertheless treat empire in this highly problematic way are Marie-Janine Calic, *The Great Cauldron* (Cambridge, 2019), and John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations* (Princeton, 2020).

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in the nineteenth century in relationships that cannot be understood in purely binary terms. Some historians have also argued persuasively that the very meanings of nationhood in the nineteenth century did not demand independent statehood and that empire shaped nationalism's very character.

Another way that historians can escape the limits imposed on them by a universalizing nationalist dynamic is to recall how the political claims of states or politicians are not necessarily anchored in the most intimate personal experiences of their own populations. For the latter, ethnic, linguistic, or confessional diversity is often a constitutive and cherished part of family or community history. Governments can seek to forge unity for their purposes by proclaiming the primacy of impersonal nations as the building blocks of tradition, but families and communities often remember experiences that contradict or displace these overly abstract collective narratives. Experiences of daily life multilingualism, mobility, or interconfessional cooperation can even bring individuals—at least privately—to question the logic of sweeping nationalist identifications. These same experiences can leave individuals skeptical of nationalist narratives. Families or communities may not possess the power, confidence, or even an interest in publicly challenging nationalist political narratives, but historians have invoked such family and community stories to create alternative narratives for society, narratives whose subjects and agents are not primarily determined by national identifications. Almost twenty years ago, historians of central and Eastern Europe began talking about a phenomenon they called "national indifference" or "indifference to nationhood." At the time, these terms offered historians a strategic vocabulary with which to conceptualize the possibility that nationalism, national belonging, or national loyalty was merely one of many ways to see the world. Its momentary popularity might depend for its power more on situation than on some kind of authentic sense of identity. Whereas historians of the region had often asked what ideological identification might possibly have competed with or displaced nationalism (religion? Marxism?), these historians posed a different kind of question: At what points, under what circumstances in their lives, might nationhood have mattered to people? And in what situations did it lose its relevance? How had people in history used or ignored arguments made by nationalists opportunistically, to pursue their own interests such as to achieve social mobility? For these historians, nationalism was not so much an ideology to be countered, but rather a situational approach to understanding one's world and one's circumstances, local, regional, or imperial.[105]

Nevertheless, while professional historians work to demonstrate the contingency of national loyalties, to understand what produces situational nationalist political mobilizations, and to distinguish the popular meanings and implications of nationhood in different historical periods, influential politicians are hard at work in the other

105 Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls* (Ithaca, 2008); Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities"; Pieter M. Judson, "Nationalism and Indifference," in *Habsburg Neu Denken. Vielfalt und Ambivalenz in Zentraleuropa. 30 kulturwissenschaftliche Stichwörter*, ed. Johannes Feichtinger and Heidemarie Uhl (Vienna, 2016); Judson, *Guardians of the Nation* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Dominique K. Reill, *The Fiume Crisis* (Cambridge, MA, 2020); Gabor Egry, "Negotiating Post-Imperial Transitions," in *Embers of Empire*, ed. Claire Morelon and Paul Miller (New York, 2018); Brendan Karch, *Nation and Loyalty in a German-Polish Borderland* (New York, 2018); Maarten van Ginderachter and Jon Fox, eds., *National Indifference and the History of Nationalism in Modern Europe* (London, 2020). See also Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).

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direction. They and their allies in the profession seek to cement a belief in unchanging nationalist loyalties—with their imperial implications—in order to make them a predictable basis for political mobilization. While historians of the Atlantic world engage in debates over the treatment of existing monuments to slavery and slaveowners, for example, several governments in today's central and Eastern Europe are hard at work creating monuments and museums to reinforce their new, frequently racially tinged histories. For them it is often a question of erecting monuments to formerly discredited nationalist or fascist leaders, removing older monuments to not nationalistic enough historical figures, creating new museums to impose discredited national narratives on their collections, and replacing historical exhibitions that sought to raise other kinds of questions among the public. They seek to regulate what can and what cannot be written by historians, they withdraw funds from respected historical institutions, and shower their own sponsored historians with largesse. Whether they can succeed in their ambitions remains an open question. But for those historians who are trying to do their work under increasingly impossible—and often humiliating—conditions, the question that remains is about sheer survival. Will they be able to outlive the determined efforts of states to silence them?

Cemil Aydin

Post-Ottoman Turkey and the Geopolitics of Nationalism

The suffering of Syrian refugees crossing the waters of the Aegean Sea from Turkish coasts to Greek islands from 2012 to 2017 symbolized the crisis of the nation-state order in today's world. What is often forgotten is that, from 1910 to the mid-1920s, when the current nation-state-based world order was beginning to take shape parallel to the disintegration of the Ottoman imperial entity in the region, millions of Greek and Turkish migrants crossed the same waters in both directions, either fleeing war or obeying the internationally binding legal arrangement of population exchange monitored by the League of Nations.[106] In the aftermath of World War I, the ideal of nationalism and states with homogenous populations associated with Wilsonian principles emerged as a medicine that was supposed to cure the conflicts, violence, and pain caused by multiethnic and multireligious empires such as the Ottoman Empire.[107] Yet, the magic pill of national partition of the multiethnic

106 On Greek-Turkish population exchange, see Sarah D. Shields, "Forced Migration as Nation-Building," *Journal of the History of International Law* 18.1 (2016); Aslı Iğsız, *Humanism in Ruins Entangled Legacies of the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange* (Stanford, 2018); Umut Ozsu, *Formalizing Displacement* (Oxford, 2015).

107 Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates* (London, 2015). For the violence caused by population transfers and partitions in the name of Wilsonian norms in the Middle East, see Laura Robson, *States of Separation* (Oakland, 2017).

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empires retrospectively associated with liberal internationalism has proven to be poisonous for the post-Ottoman Middle East and Balkans, shattering more lives by justifying cases of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and population transfers throughout the twentieth century.[108]

Contemporary states in the Middle East normalize their borders by monopolizing historical narratives on the inevitable transition from the multinational Ottoman Empire to majoritarian nations. Yet, every aspect of the earlier nationalist stories of independent states emerging out of the collapsed Ottoman imperial system has been proven wrong by historical scholarship. The Wilsonian moment of 1919, for example, was not the beginning of decolonization for Ottoman-ruled Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, but rather the reverse. Ottoman Arab provinces were colonized after WWI by European powers in the name of national self-determination and religious tolerance. The League of Nations mandate system was designed to implement the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declarations rather than liberate Arab populations from Ottoman rule.[109] Recent scholarship has highlighted how, despite the significance of diverse Arab, Turkic, Greek, Jewish, Armenian, and Kurdish identities in the late Ottoman Empire before WWI, the current borders in the region could not be justified by supposedly innate primordial nations. A set of contingent events from the 1910s to the 1960s partitioned the populations of the Middle East into nation-state units and led to tragic forfeiture of alternative political imaginaries, including projects such as a reformed and decentralized Ottoman Empire or regional Arab-Turkish federations.[110]

If the current dominant narratives about the naturalness and inevitability of the nation-states in the post-Ottoman Middle East rarely matches historical experience, why was nationalist thought embraced not only by academic theorists, but also by political leaders? Strategic and geopolitical use of the ideology of nationalism by the political elite and intellectuals of the Turkish Republic to solve their problem of domestic and international legitimacy may give us some insight into the global spread of nationalist thought. Turkish-speaking Muslim elites of the late Ottoman government fought to preserve the multinational empire during the half century preceding WWI. They accepted a vision of a nation-state only after the Ottoman surrender at the end of the war, ironically in reference to the Wilsonian principal of self-determination that was mobilized to colonize the Arab provinces, and only as a bitter pill to be swallowed for survival. Yet, by the mid-1920s, the Turkish Republic transformed the idea of nation—initially considered a last resort solution for survival and salvation in the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire—into a desirable telos of their history. They further promoted ideals of ethnic nationality, modernization, and secularism to geopolitically bolster the Turkish Republic's sovereignty and international legitimacy while trying to create a homogeneous nation among the diverse populations of Anatolia.[111]

108 See Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores* (Oxford, 2009); Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide* (Oxford, 2005); Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution* (Stanford, 2014).

109 Ussama Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence* (Oakland, 2020). For the Ottoman legacy in Arab political imaginaries, see Michael Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge, 2017); Orit Bashkin, *The Other Iraq* (Stanford, 2010). For the persistence of nonnational cosmopolitan identities, see Sarah Shields, "Mosul, the Ottoman Legacy and the League of Nations," *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies* 3.2 (2009).

110 For the viability and appeal of Ottomanism in the Arab provinces, see Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers* (Stanford, 2011); Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks* (Berkeley, 1997); Selim Deringil, *The Ottoman Twilight in the Arab Lands* (Brighton, MA, 2019). For Turkish-Arab federalism visions, see Alp Yenen, "Envisioning Turco-Arab Co-existence between Empire and Nationalism," *Die Welt des Islams* 61.1 (2020).

111 See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's interview in Charles H. Sherrill, *A Year's Embassy to Mustafa Kemal* (New York, 1934). For discussion of the use of women's emancipation and feminism, see Kathryn Libal, "Staging Turkish Women's Emancipation," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4.1 (2008). The Turkish government published a French-language magazine to promote the new secular Westernized nation to Europeans, *La Turquie kemaliste* (1937).

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This does not mean that Kemalists alone produced the theory of nationalism and gifted that to Cold War–era Western academia.[112] Yet the particular narration formulated by Republican leaders of how the Turkish nation emerged out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire during the interwar period illustrates why a theory of nationalism succeeded in persuading a hostile Euro-American elite that Turkey had proved its civilized status in accordance with Eurocentric criteria and deserved recognition of sovereign equality. The Turkish elite's complicity in globalizing the form of the nation-state illustrates the crucial significance of geopolitics in universalizing nationalist thought and practice from WWI to the Cold War period.

Post–World War II modernization and nationalism scholarship promoted by American social sciences were full of praises for the Turkish experience of nation-building.[113] Given American and European depictions of "The Terrible Turk" in the early 1920s, this transformation in Turkey's image from Muslim enemy to model westernized nation (which facilitated its induction into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952) may seem rather surprising.[114] Yet, early Cold War American and Western European praise for Turkish modernization was partly the achievement of Turkish leaders and intellectuals who used the theories of nationalism, secularism, and Westernization to erase the negative associations of their Muslim identity in the imagined Euro-American center of the international order, and create an amnesia about the alternative political possibilities of the imperial past. Nationalism provided a story of a usable past that Americans, Western Europeans, and Turks could agree on to strengthen their geopolitical alliance in the early Cold War while offering a means of moral redemption for past violence.

The Turkish Republic's radical cultural Westernization programs became crucial in their teleological vision that nation-states with ethnically homogenous majorities epitomized the final stage in the modernization of the world. Turkish leaders initially used nationalism in a contradictory way in propaganda during the war of independence from 1920 to 1923. On the one hand, they continued the apologetic rejection of Eurocentric racial discourses concerning Muslims, with a counterhegemonic discourse of civilization that Turks and Muslims were civilized people deserving of equality, self-determination, and sovereignty. Thus, the Turkish war of independence against the terms of the Treaty of Sevres (signed in August 1920) and Greek invasion of Western Anatolia was depicted and perceived as a war for the dignity of the Muslim world and the survival of the Ottoman caliphate, supported strongly by Indian Muslims and the Bolshevik government in Moscow. On the other hand, Turkish leaders emphasized that what they tried to achieve—self-determination for the Turkish and Muslim majority in Anatolia—was harmonious with both Wilsonianism and the French model of nationhood. The nationalist government in Ankara received the Allied powers' recognition of its sovereignty in 1923 after a long

112 Cf. Sebastian Conrad, "The Colonial Ties Are Liquidated," *Past and Present*, no. 216 (2012).

113 Lilo Linke, *Allah Dethroned* (London, 1937); Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Ataturk* (Philadelphia, 1939); Roger Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914–1939* (Minneapolis, 1971); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York, 1958); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York, 1961); George C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West," *Foreign Affairs* 32.4 (July 1954); Dankwart Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920–1955," in *Islam and the West*, ed. Richard N. Frye (Netherlands, 1957); Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964); Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London, 1998). In 1958, CBS aired a documentary on Atatürk full of praise of Turkey's nation-building experience in *The Twentieth Century Documentary Series*, "The Incredible Turk."

114 Roni Margulies, *The Terrible Turk* (Istanbul, 2016); John M. VanderLippe, "Racism and the Making of American Foreign Policy," *Research in Politics and Society* 6 (1999).

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struggle on both military and diplomatic fronts to undo the terms of the Sevres Treaty. The Pan-Islamic Indian Khilafat movement played a key role in pressuring the British Empire on behalf of Turkish nationalists. Representatives of the Ankara government at Lausanne may have offered other political imaginaries—such as a reformation of the Ottoman Empire as a federation of Arab, Turkish, and Kurdish Muslims under a spiritual caliphate—but they soon realized that nation-state with a Muslim majority was the only option available to them on the negotiation table.[115]

Upon the recognition of its sovereignty in 1923 as a Muslim majority nation, Turkish elites highlighted a late Ottoman narrative that the Lausanne Treaty represented the inclusion of a formerly excluded non-Western society as a full and equal member into European international society. When the leaders of the Turkish Republic went through their formative education in the late Ottoman period, they were consistently taught that Ottoman Turkey was included in European imperial society as an equal member in 1856; something bestowed on them by the Paris Peace Treaty concluding the Crimean War. The Ottoman elite claimed that, despite fulfilling all the criteria of civilization necessary for this membership, their empire was ultimately excluded and treated unequally because of the Muslim identity of its dynasty and majority population. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 formally eliminated extraterritoriality and capitulations and recognized the legal equality of the new Turkey. The treaty also meant the rejection of Western Armenian demands for a homeland in Anatolia. Turkish nationalists perceived and presented their diplomatic achievements at Lausanne as a reinclusion of a righteous nation after more than a half century of struggle against racial treatment and unequal international law.[116] According to the new Turkish national narrative, the world order that excluded the Ottomans from 1856 to 1914, and eventually included the Republic in 1923 with recognition of legal sovereignty, was the same European imperial world order.

Yet, at the same time, the Turkish elite were aware of the persistence of the racial discourses and civilizational hierarchies that continued to characterize the liberal international order of the interwar period regulated by the League of Nations. After all, the Arab populations of the Ottoman Empire were subjected to an unequal mandate regime based on their inferiority in civilization, and racialized empires continued in Asia and Africa. Thus, despite their full sovereignty without extraterritorial laws or unequal treaties as assured with the Lausanne Treaty, the leaders of the Turkish Republic still felt they could face exclusion due to religious or racial difference.

At that point, the Turkish government could have continued the Muslim modernist legacy of anti-racist and globalist discourse of civilization and international law while trying to persuade the European publics that Asians and Muslims deserved respect, rights, and equality. Preservation of a spiritual caliphate for the imagined Muslim world in Istanbul

115 Ahmed Riza, a leading Young Turk intellectual and former speaker of the Ottoman parliament, utilized his networks in France during the Turkish war of independence to argue for the moral legitimacy of the idea of Turkey's sovereignty and independence. Ahmed Riza, *The Moral Bankruptcy of Western Policy Towards the East* (Ankara, 1988). A prominent Indian Muslim intellectual emphasized the civility of Muslims to make a case for the rights of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world in the new League of Nations. See "Address by the Right Hon. Syed Ameer Ali on Islam in the League of Nations," *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 5 (1919). For another civilizationist defense of Ottoman Turkey's right to self-determination and sovereignty during the Paris Peace Conference, see Carolin Liebisch-Gümüş, "Defending Turkey on Global Stages," *New Global Studies* 10.3 (2016).

116 Mehmed Cemil Bilsel, *Cemiyet-i Akvam, Suret-i Teessüsü, Mahiyeti, Vezaifi, Teşkilatı, Misakı* (1340; repr. Istanbul, 1924); Mehmed Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan* (Istanbul, 1933).

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during the war of independence and the Lausanne Treaty negotiation also necessitated this apologetic Muslim modernism. Yet, the Turkish government changed its cultural diplomacy approach completely by abandoning Pan-Islamic civilizational discourse. Instead, Turkish leaders hoped to persuade the European and American publics that, as a new nation-state, they could culturally belong to European civilization via a radical program of Westernization. In March 1924, the Turkish Parliament abolished the spiritual Ottoman caliphate in Istanbul, symbolically severing their ties with colonized Muslim societies in South Asia and Arab Middle East. If Turkey no longer represented a hostile Muslim civilization and empire for Europe, then European empires could respect the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic. According to the Turkish narrative of nationalism, the ideal of a secular nation-state is the result of the gradual diffusion of European values of political order to the non-Western world and its successful embrace by the non-Western educated elite, which should eliminate discrimination against Turkey as a Muslim country in the interwar-era world order. By the late 1930s, Turkish elites felt that this new strategy of gaining legitimacy in European and American public opinion via the westernized reputation of their nation was more successful compared to the late Ottoman strategy of defending the modernity of Islamic civilization.

The Turkish Republic's embrace of the nationalist narrative served other political goals, especially in offering moral justification to violence and mass murders committed during the transition from the multiethnic Ottoman times of the 1910s to the nation-state of the late 1920s. The Turkish elite constructed a revolutionary romance of emancipation for their own citizens, but the narrative of national triumph from invasion, racial discrimination, and oppression was mixed with the trauma of loss and suffering that the imagined national community had to endure during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. The new Turkish nationalism had to depict the Ottoman imperial past in a negative light, accusing it of depriving the Turkish nation from fulfilling its own destiny by giving them a false imperial consciousness and leading them to countless unnecessary sacrifices in the name of saving a multinational empire. Turkish populations also had to make sense of the memories of violence, including ethnic cleansing that the late Ottoman government perpetuated on their Armenian citizens, as well as forced population transfers that partitioned the Turks and Greeks in the Balkans and Anatolia. Separation from Arabs needed to be justified as well, because Arab leaders who could speak Ottoman Turkish well and knew the leaders of Turkey personally kept resisting European colonialism throughout the interwar period. The early Republican regime exerted violence against Kurdish populations that objected to the new secular nationalist ideology based on the primacy of the Turkish ethnicity. Those who witnessed the shattered lives of millions of diverse Ottoman peoples from 1911 onward could make moral sense of the past trauma and tragedy

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while justifying the multiple crimes committed during this process by using a salvation narrative of nationalism. If the sovereign ethnic nation is the teleological destination of Turkish history, then all the suffering and violence on the path to this ultimate goal was justified. In that way, nationalism isn't just conjured out of thin air or divine fiat, but emerged as a response to the political and moral crises experienced by this generation at the expense of their non-Turkish neighbors. The bitter pill of nationalism was swallowed as a magical cure for many ailments, while offering a teleological story of salvation absolving everyone from responsibility for the sufferings caused by the transition from empire to nation.

Frederick Cooper

Nationalism and Liberation in an Unequal World

The most durable achievement of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* is not his argument about the ascendance of nationalism, but the prominence he gave to the concept of political imagination.[117] Nationalism became an *available* construct in the Americas and Europe from the late eighteenth century onward, but it was not the only way in which political imagination found expression.

In studying what is often seen as the culmination of nationalism's spread around the world in the late 1940s and 1950s, I began to see the limitations of the nationalist narrative. Some of the most influential leaders of French West Africa were in those years seeking alternatives to both colonial empire and the nation-state. Léopold Sédar Senghor compared nationalism variously to "an old hunting rifle" and "an infantile illness." His fellow Senegalese activist Mamadou Dia asserted, "it is necessary that in final analysis the imperialist conception of the nation-state give way to the modern conception of the multinational state." Senghor and Dia sought a federation of French African colonies that would become part of a confederation in which European France and its former overseas territories would be equals. Similarly, labor movements in French Africa won gains in wages and benefits by making claims *within* the institutions and ideological frameworks of the empire, while attacking the racial underpinnings of these frameworks. Only later, after the goal of federation and confederation proved unrealizable, did Senghor and Dia turn as a second choice to independence in the form of the territorial state and rewrite history as the building of a Senegalese nation.[118]

117 Max Bergholz, "Thinking the Nation," *AHR* 123.2 (2018).

118 Léopold Sédar Senghor, "Rapport sur le méthode du Parti," *Condition Humaine*, April 26, 1949; Mamadou Dia, "L'Afrique Noire devant la nouveau destin de l'Union Francaise," *Condition Humaine*, August 29, 1955. See also Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*.

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Even the great stalwart of nationalism in British Africa, Kwame Nkrumah, doubted that the nation-state was a sufficient response to imperialist power. In 1958, the year after his country of Ghana became independent, he offered to give up some of its hard-won sovereignty to create a United States of Africa, which would be more of a force than the nation-state in changing the international order. What Adom Getachew calls "worldmaking"—transforming international institutions and relationships—stood alongside nation-making in the political imagination of some of the most influential opponents of colonialism.[119] Indeed, since early in the twentieth century, different forms of internationalism as well as a worldwide uprising against imperialism or a global communist revolution had been among the objectives of continent-crossing networks.[120]

That as late as the 1950s and 1960s some of the most forward-looking opponents of colonial empire sought alternatives to nationalism or looked beyond the nation-state toward federation, confederation, or global revolution suggests that the empire to nation-state narrative, going back to the eighteenth century, needs to be rethought. Without minimizing the importance of nationalism there are three problems with making it the basis of a metanarrative: it misses the salience of other imagined political formations, both broader (including empire, what Anderson was writing against) and narrower (local, ethnic); it underestimates conflicting views of what constituted a nation; and it fails to examine other goals and imperatives with which nationalism had to articulate. Anderson tries to downplay class, but the issue is not an either-or choice but a relationship. People came to expect something from a state, and aspirations for a state that was "theirs" did not necessarily line up with what people wanted from it. Instead of adhering to a self-driven history of nationalism moving forward in time and outward in space, we should recognize histories of overlapping and contested conceptions of political belonging and political goals.

During the fifty or so years in which I have been a student of African history, nationalism has moved into and out of focus. Scholars of African nationalism in its moment of ascendency in the 1950s and 1960s looked at it in different ways. One—which might better be termed nation-statism—defined nationalism as the quest of a self-defined people in a specific territory to have its own government and recognized sovereignty; another was open to differing forms of liberation—social, economic, and cultural as well as political—from imperial power.[121]

It was territorial sovereignty that proved to be the realizable goal; liberation in a broader sense was more elusive. Welcoming African and Asian countries into what was becoming a world of nation-states gave a great boost to making nation the primary unit of historical analysis by adding the dynamics of racial liberation. The tired debates of European history—good nationalism (French) versus bad nationalism (Nazi), civic versus ethnic nationalism—could give way to more inclusive views and broaden the scope of historical inquiry. Each new state would have

119 Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire* (Princeton, 2019).

120 Tim Harper, *Underground Asia* (Cambridge, MA, 2020); John Sidel, *Republicanism, Communism, Islam* (Ithaca, 2021); Bedasse et al., "*AHR* Conversation: Black Internationalism," *AHR* 125.5 (2020).

121 An influential example from the 1950s of the nation-statism approach is James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review* 48.2 (1954), and of the liberation school, Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London, 1956).

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its archives, newspapers, and university, with a history department, students, and faculty eager to write national histories.

As Senghor and Nkrumah predicted, many of the new nation-states of the 1960s soon proved unable to overcome the asymmetries of economic and political power on a global scale. They were also beset by rival claims of who constituted the nation as well as insufficient resources to give most citizens a clear material interest in their sovereign status. Even leaders who advocated federating African nations into a more inclusive ensemble suppressed attempts to create federal structures *within* the state that would acknowledge multiple claims to recognition as a "people." Making nationalism the basis of a state often entailed exclusion and imposition—in decolonizing Africa as it had in Europe during the "unmixing" following World Wars I and II.[122] Elsewhere, the liberated nation was often less than liberating: Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and other states took authoritarian turns.[123] In much of Latin America, leftist populism—which put redistributive politics within a national framework—fell before right-wing dictatorships allied with reactionary upper classes supported by the United States (e.g., Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1976).

By the 1970s, scholars were looking beyond the binary of colonial empire and independent state to explain the shortcomings of liberation. World system theory, pioneered by the Africanist Immanuel Wallerstein, and dependency theory with its Latin American roots found explanation in the development of global economic structures divided between core and periphery. These approaches marked a break with methodological nationalism, but to working historians the new theories were not always satisfying. They were too abstract and left little place for agency, process, or causation.[124]

In 1983 Anderson's recentering of nationalism brilliantly captured much of the Left's disillusionment with overturning the global order and a growing interest in the constructed nature of political affinities. But historical research later made clear that not all construction was national, not least in the creole American societies where Anderson found the cradle of nationalism. Revolution in the British, French, and Spanish Americas began as struggles within empire, in terms of imperial ideologies, before they became struggles to get out of empire.[125] Anderson's insistence that the nationalist imagination was based on a "horizontal" vision of society ran up against the vertical construction of creole societies, in which current and former slaves, Indigenous peoples, and peasants were the object of conflicting efforts at mobilization, self-organization, and repression.[126] Anderson's propositions, however, had the welcome effect of enabling debate over just these issues.

By the late 1990s the pendulum seemed to swing in the opposite direction. The new conceptual gold rush was toward globalization, sometimes glossed as a welcome dynamic, sometimes as a threat to gains made within national contexts, sometimes as a phenomenon of the late twentieth century or else the nineteenth, or perhaps the sixteenth. In

122 See Lydia Walker's contribution to this forum; Jean Marie Allman, *Quills of the Porcupine* (Madison, WI, 1993); Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States* (London, 2016); Dawn Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge, 2010).

123 On the bifurcation between authoritarian states and radical movements in the Middle East, see Yoav Di-Capua, "The Slow Revolution," *AHR* 123.3 (2018).

124 Frederick Cooper et al., *Confronting Historical Paradigms* (Madison, WI, 1993). To be sure, some dependency theorists advocated national autarky as a remedy to capitalist exploitation while right-wing rulers claimed the mantle of nationalism while favoring market economies and cooperation with the United States.

125 Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, 2006).

126 For a critique of Anderson's notion of horizontality, see Claudio Lomnitz, "Nationalism as a Practical System," in *The Other Mirror*, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves (Princeton, 2001).

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a world of flows and connections, nation-states and their boundaries were said to be losing whatever importance they had once had, and national perspectives on history were held to be constricting and obfuscating. Innovative research that focused on oceans and networks shook up a profession whose job descriptions and teaching curricula usually emphasized continents and nations. The conceit that national polities were becoming passée did not survive the obsession with national security that followed September 11, 2001. But even before then arguments about the universal decline of a nation-centered history were as dubious as arguments for its prior ubiquity.[127]

Smaller than the globe but larger than nation-states are empires. Their comeback in historical circles is now familiar, some would say too familiar. The empire-to-nation-state transition has been confronted with the argument that empire is a persistent but flexible form of political organization, inflected by nationalism and not necessarily overturned by it. The challenges to empires were serious and sometimes successful, but most were contained by the imperial powers until they weakened each other in two world wars. New forms of empire (Japan, Nazi Germany) and polities with an imperial reach that denied the label of empire (the Soviet Union, the United States) had a prominent place in twentieth-century history.[128]

In mobilizing Africans to challenge a French empire weakened by World War II, Senghor used a metaphor that Anderson would later employ—that of "horizontal solidarity"—to posit a conception of political action different from Anderson's. Senghor sought to develop horizontal solidarity across French Africa to enable Africans to make claims on France, based on what he termed "vertical solidarity." Only the combination of horizontal and vertical solidarities, he argued, would take Africans out of the dilemma of choosing between unity in poverty and subordination. Senghor's layered vision of sovereignty—territorial, African, Franco-African—was an attempt to turn these solidarities into institutions of governance at different levels, a strategy that also had its appeal to some anticolonial activists in Asia.[129]

Colonial states were not making concessions out of a sudden embrace of the equality of humankind. They acted for reasons of state—to preserve themselves as something more than small states on the western edge of Eurasia. But a more inclusive empire would also be a more expensive empire, and the escalating demands within the terms of imperial citizenship—and grudging acceptance that Africans were now political interlocutors and not the primitives of colonial mythology—helped to push France and Britain, notably, to relinquish their sovereign power over most colonies. Revolution in the colonies was one danger. Reform was another.

In 1945, imperial states had no intention or expectation that they would soon give up power over their colonies. By the end of the 1950s, they realized that they could live with a postcolonial world in which their former colonies had independence not only from the former metropole

127 Frederick Cooper, "What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective," *African Affairs* 100 (2001).

128 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History* (Princeton, 2010); Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest, 2015). See also Sebastian Conrad's contribution to this forum.

129 Karuna Mantena, "Popular Sovereignty and Anti-Colonialism," in *Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective*, ed. Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 2016).

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but from each other. Vertical connections could still be manipulated. The United States also came to accept decolonization, balancing its fear of postimperial chaos and racist views of ex-colonial leadership against confidence in American economic and cultural power, an interest in world markets without the constraints of imperial preference, and conviction that its allies' colonial interests should not stand in the way of the struggle against communism. For all these actors, coming from different positions, a postimperial world of territorial states was not necessarily the first choice, but it came to be a choice that they could live with. The elites of newly independent states—and those of France, Britain, and other ex-colonial powers—were left to try to construct a more national past than they had actually lived.

Nationalism in the form of nation-statism implies a hard vision of sovereignty, with "majoritarian, homogenizing, and exclusionary tendencies that appeared embedded in the structure of the nation-state."[130] On the opposite side of the coin is the possibility that the nation-state can be a site where people develop a sense of collective purpose and work for social protections for all members of the polity. For a time, newly independent African states devoted more resources to education and health than their colonial predecessors. This is why the study of nationalism should entail asking what sort of nation activists sought to build.

Since the collapse of colonial empires, sovereignties have both hardened and softened. Some rulers of new African states, most of them with limited economic resources, now regard sovereignty as the main asset they have. They have policed borders against "foreign" Africans or internal secessionists, and they have treated criticism of human rights violations as neocolonial intrusions.[131] European states eventually decided that they liked the idea of layered sovereignty, but with their relatively affluent fellow Europeans rather than with the people they had once kept in a state of subordination, giving rise decades later to the European Union, the Schengen system, and the euro.[132]

In Africa, the nation-state has proved an inadequate defense against the predations of global capitalism.[133] Even Nkrumah had to cede much control over Ghana's economy to multinational aluminum companies as he tried to diversify its economy; world recession in the 1970s and 1980s put most African states in financial thrall to the International Monetary Fund; and Chinese corporations now come to Africa from a position of strength. Well aware of such dangers, African, Asian, and Latin American states pushed for the reform of international economic institutions, including calls for a "development decade" in the 1960s and a New International Economic Order in the 1970s. The rich Western states not only refused the latter demand, but rejected its premise and strove to deny any political or ideological basis for demands of the poor states on the rich. We now have a world of sovereign equivalence and extreme inequality—just what worried leaders including Nkrumah and Senghor in the 1950s.[134]

130 Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 179. Exclusionary politics was intrinsic to both colonial states and nation-states. Colonies of settlement—the United States, Australia, and Israel for example—produced particularly stark patterns of racialized exclusion when they became self-governing states fueled by the nationalism of the settlers' descendants.

131 For a nuanced discussion of human rights and sovereignty in Africa, see Bonny Ibhawoh, *Human Rights in Africa* (Cambridge, 2018).

132 For relational views of sovereignty, see John Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty* (Lanham, MD, 2017), and James Sheehan, "The Problem of Sovereignty in European History," *AHR* 111.1 (2006). One concept that belongs in the dustbin of history is Westphalian sovereignty, at least for anyone who thinks that the hard sovereignty found in the late twentieth century has anything to do with 1648.

133 For a different point of view see Richard Drayton in this forum.

134 Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*; Slobodian, *Globalists*.

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Any history of nationalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries needs to confront the late date at which different forms of imperial or postimperial polities were contested possibilities. If one takes the triumph of nationalism as inevitable, neither the persistence of alternatives nor how and why we ended up with a world of nation-states can be explained. I have tried to answer that question in regard to French Africa by focusing on the decolonization process itself, on the tensions between what aspiring leaders wanted and what they could get.[135]

Nationalism remains an essential dimension of political life and history, in Africa as elsewhere. Scholars' understanding of the place of nation and nationalism has changed in uneasy connection to ongoing developments on and beyond the African continent. As historians, we need to be careful about looking for, and therefore finding, linear trajectories. If we wish to understand change on a global scale and over long periods of time, we need the conceptual tools to explain how nation and empire, nationalism and internationalism, and mobilizations on the basis of nation, class, gender, ethnicity, or race overlapped and developed in complex relationship with each other.[136]

Lydia Walker

Minority Nationalisms in Postwar Decolonization

December 1960 closed the "year of Africa" at the United Nations (UN), when seventeen countries on the continent received independence and the UN's Fourth Committee on Colonialism, under Indian chairmanship, declared national self-determination an international norm.[137] That same year, Angami Zapu Phizo, the leader of a nationalist movement for an independent Nagaland in Northeast India, arrived in London.[138] Since India served as an emblem of successful national liberation and Third World leadership, the Naga nationalist claim threatened to create a dangerously uncomfortable discussion about self-determination for minority peoples within new postcolonial states among those who supported national liberation in colonial contexts.[139]

Situating the Naga claim, and those of the many other nationalist movements that did not receive international recognition, within the context of postwar global decolonization's seeming nationalist possibility illustrates how "marginal" issues recast large geopolitical questions: they focus attention on those who lack power rather than those who wield it, on those who seem to have lost their fight for independence rather than those who won. In the process, this shift in attention transforms the terrain on which those issues of sovereignty, independence,

135 Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*.

136 See also the essays of Glenda Sluga and Sandrine Kott in this forum.

137 General Assembly Resolution 1514, *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* (December 14, 1960).

138 Northeast India as a regional label is as externally constructed and symptomatic of hierarchical power relations as that of the Middle East. "The term Northeast India points to no more than the area's location on India's map." Sanjib Baruah, *Durable Disorder* (Oxford, 2005), 4.

139 It is also important to note the limits of Nehru's own practical support for anticolonial nationalism during global decolonization, see Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM," *Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Studies* 46.2 (2008).

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and national liberation are defined, revising their meaning, portrayal, and practice. This analytical move places so-called national failures alongside professed successful national liberation movements—successful in terms of receiving recognition of their claim of statehood. Therefore, it includes political entities that remain states-in-waiting in the study and construction of an international order consisting of recognized states.[140] It also breaks up chronologies where national "success" or "failure" may simply be a matter of a narrative's chosen end date.

This narrative could be told from multiple perspectives. It could feature the position of Biafra, the nationalist movement in Nigeria that became a flashpoint for international humanitarian advocacy in the late 1960s, but which received relatively little international recognition for its claim of sovereignty.[141] It could highlight the ongoing experiences of the Kurds, who have petitioned international organizations since the interwar era, yet whose 2017 self-determination referendum in Iraq received little international support even from their allies.[142] It could focus on the Moluccans, caught between a postcolonial Indonesia that perceived them as imperial collaborators and the metropolitan Netherlands that wished to sublimate their nationalist claim within the framework of diaspora.[143] Nationalist claimants, as well as the governing authorities they resist, have an analytical investment to present these movements as singular, unique historical cases, whether to exceptionalize or to minimize their impact.[144] Yet tracing the trajectory of such a claim through the waves of postwar decolonization shows how these histories were also variations that articulated the theme of national liberation's limitations.

The first wave of postwar decolonization occurred in Asia after the Second World War. In the crescent of revolution from Calcutta to Singapore, there was little intermission between great power conflict and the wars of independence.[145] This decolonization also served as the training ground for global advocacy for national liberation, where international communist and liberationist networks supported certain Asian independence movements.[146] Many of these advocates then turned their attention to subsequent anticolonial nationalist movements during the second wave of postwar decolonization, whose epicenter in the late 1950s and early 1960s was on the African continent. The advocacy network that supported African anticolonial nationalists such as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), and Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) included Indian activists, particularly Jayaprakash Narayan, who was the international face of the post-Gandhi Indian peace movement.[147] This network sought to help decolonization escape its "entrapment in violence" by channeling the energies of national liberation into peaceful, anticolonial, anticommunist states.[148]

The British antiapartheid advocate Michael Scott, a long-term friend and colleague of Narayan, served as the spokesperson for the Herero people of South West Africa/Namibia at the United Nations for nearly

140 Lydia Walker, *States-in-Waiting: Global Decolonization and Its Discontents* (Cambridge, forthcoming). Recent scholarship on other examples include Miranda Johnson, "Indigenizing Self-Determination at the United Nations," *Journal of the History of International Law* 23.1 (2021); Sam Klug, "'What, Then, of the Land?,'" *Journal of the History of International Law* 23.1 (2021).

141 Tehila Sasson, "In the Name of Humanity" (PhD diss., UC Berkeley, 2015), 22–44; Samuel Fury Childs Daly, *A History of the Republic of Biafra* (Cambridge, 2020).

142 Susan Pedersen, "Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932," *AHR* 115.4 (2010); Morgan Kaplan, "Foreign Support, Miscalculation, and Conflict Escalation," *Ethnopolitics* 18.1 (2019).

143 Hans van Amersfoort, "The Waxing and Waning of a Diaspora," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30.1 (2004).

144 Colaso Chase (public spokesperson for the Naga National Council in Medziphema, Nagaland, India), in discussion with the author, December 25, 2018. Chase rejected any comparison between the Naga and Tibetan claims because of Nagaland's unique history.

145 This continuity is illustrated in Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten Armies* (New York, 2005) and Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Wars* (Cambridge, MA, 2006).

146 Michele Louro, Carolien Stolte, Heather Streets-Salter, and Sana Tannoury-Karam, eds., *The League against Imperialism* (Leiden, 2020); Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge, MA, 2012).

147 Lydia Walker, "Jayaprakash Narayan and the Politics of Reconciliation for the Postcolonial State and its Imperial Fragments," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 56.2 (2019).

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three decades. He first represented Hereros in 1949 while a member of the Indian delegation to Lake Success, the temporary home of the United Nations. In 1960, he took up the Naga cause, and in 1966 he was deported from India for his Naga advocacy. The evolution of Scott's relationship with the Indian government over two decades illuminated how political realities changed, even as the same individuals attempted to navigate them. Naga nationalism, as a claim from within a postcolonial state, cast a government whose leadership used to belong to an anticolonial nationalist movement in the role of "imperial" oppressor.[149] While they grew out of each other, the results of the first (c. 1947) and second (at its height in 1960) waves of postwar decolonization did not fit together neatly into a trajectory of progressive liberation—both created newly sovereign boundaries that encased minorities who would have preferred to rule themselves.[150]

The third wave of postwar decolonization occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of South African apartheid; another set of international realignments creating new postcolonial nation-states. During this period, various UN committees began to hear claims from peoples based on indigeneity, from some of the same groups who had previously used the language of nationalism.[151] From the perspective of Indigenous claimants, "the broken promises of decolonization were the basis of Indigenous populations' movement toward human rights."[152] James Henderson, the North American Indigenous legal theorist who articulated those words, explicitly invoked the experiences of Nagas, Karens and Kachins (of Myanmar), and South Sudan as those who were promised a state and then betrayed by postcolonial institutions of international order.[153]

Nationalist claims by minority, Indigenous, or "sub" national peoples challenged both their ruling state government and the increasingly anticolonial international order of the United Nations, symbolized by the growing number of postcolonial states in the UN General Assembly. In South Asia, colonial categorizations made the minority versus nation conversation explicit, a result of British efforts to define and control Indian politics and society, denying the presence of an Indian nation. Indians themselves built political cultures that responded to their rulers' definitions even when contesting colonial rule.[154] Liberation movements outside South Asia maneuvered to claim national rather than ethnic or "minority" affiliation. The conceptual division between minority and nation continued to remain at the heart of international legal distinctions between peoples "owed" minority protections or national self-determination.

Recognition by, and membership in, the United Nations remained nationalist claimants' desired goal. Yet unsurprisingly, institutions of international order did not view Nagas and other peoples in similar political positions as legitimate nationalist claimants—to do so would undermine the sovereignty of their existing members. Therefore,

148 Albert Bigelow, "Some Reflections on the Conference to Establish the World Peace Brigade," 1961, World Peace Brigade North American Regional Council Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

149 Other examples include West Papua and Biafra. Emma Kluge, "West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961–1969," *International History Review* 42.6 (2020); Quito Swan, "Blinded by Bandung?," *Radical History Review* 131 (2018); Samuel Fury Childs Daly, "A Nation on Paper," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 62.4 (2020).

150 On the mutually constitutive relationship between majorities and minorities, see Benedict Anderson, "Majorities and Minorities," in *The Spectre Comparisons* (London, 1998).

151 For an example of Nagas petitioning the UN on the basis of indigeneity, see UN Economic and Social Council Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 15th Session, 12th and 13th mtg., UN Doc HR/5304 (May 17, 2016). For the formation of indigeneity as a category for claims-making in international forums, see Karen Engle, *The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development* (Durham, 2010) and Alexandra Zanthaki, *Indigenous Rights and the United Nations Standards* (Cambridge, 2010).

152 James (Sa'ke'j) Youngblood Henderson, *Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples* (Saskatoon, 2008), 27.

153 Henderson, *Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples*, 111.

154 For an overview with attention to the dynamics of the Princely States, see Eric Lewis Beverley, "Introduction: Rethinking Sovereignty, Colonial Empires, and Nation-States in South Asia and Beyond," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 40.3 (2020).

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histories of "minority" nationalisms in international context craft a narrative of decolonization's limits rather than its promise, of political foreclosure rather than opportunity, of tragedy rather than progressive liberation.

One explanation for the limited range of decolonization's political outcomes[155] is that Cold War polarity trapped anticolonial nationalism's liberatory potential into the shape of state-centric sovereignty. Classic theoretical understandings of twentieth-century sovereignty arose from the specific context of interwar Europe, the First World War Versailles settlement, the fall of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of the Third Reich, all of which accepted and promulgated Westphalian definitions of state sovereignty.[156] There are more recent interpretations that reexamine sovereignty in the postcolonial world after the end of the Cold War, finding it more related to the control (the biopolitics) of the individual as a resident of a state's territory, not necessarily as a citizen of a state.[157] During the postwar decolonization, from approximately 1945 to 1990, sovereignties multiplied. More states were granted it, in the international legal sense, while more peoples claimed it, often violently. The multiplication of sovereignties in the form of the expanding UN General Assembly occurred as sovereignty took a set, international legal shape in the form of a General Assembly seat.

Decolonization transformed sovereignty in what became the Global South through international legal recognition (sovereignty granted from the outside) and nationalist claims-making (sovereignty claimed from the inside) accelerating simultaneously. These forces did not run congruent because one involved a collectivity articulating and promoting their own self-definition, while the other required their acceptance of an externally recognized and territorially bounded political shape. Institutions of international order, specifically the United Nations, promised to navigate, regulate, and legitimize certain anticolonial nationalist movements when they took the form of UN-recognized postcolonial nation-states. Yet when confronted with nationalist movements within such states, the United Nations usually prevented them from receiving a hearing—thereby hiding from some of the institution's own constraints.

As the window of nationalist possibility (that seemed wide open in December 1960) closed, the self in self-determination became decoupled from the call for a state. Oppressed peoples were denationalized into objects of human rights advocacy; international legally sovereign states emphasized the need for greater economic self-determination rather than an expansion of political recognition that might alter their own sovereign borders.[158] Political recognition of the Naga claim and other similar claims made by "marginal" or "minority" peoples would have redrawn the postcolonial map in ways that the international legal order and emergent nation-states desperately sought to avoid—and did so successfully.

155 There is a scholarly debate between those who emphasize the potential political forms decolonization might have taken and those who place more analytical weight on the seeming inevitability of the postcolonial nation-state. For contingency, see Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, and Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time* (Durham, 2015). For its critique, see Sam Okoth Opondo, "Diplomacy and Ethnology between Empire and Nation," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 37.2 (2017); on the latter, see Musab Younis, "Against Independence," *London Review of Books* 39.13 (2017). Wilder's response to Younis is in issue.

156 Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951); Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" (1921), in *Selected Writings*, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology* (1922; repr. Chicago, 2006); Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf" (1921); and John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics* 9.4 (1957), are all writing in, or responding to, this very particular interwar Third Reich, Austro-German context. On the historical construction of the myth of Westphalian sovereignty, see Claire Vergerio, "Beyond the Nation-State," *Boston Review*, May 27, 2021.

157 John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, eds., *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony* (Chicago, 2006); Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, *States of Imagination* (Durham, 2001).

158 Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*.

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Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz

Race and Nationalism in Anticolonial Asia

A central premise can link our present global nationalist moment with the early Asian anticolonial nationalist moment of the late nineteenth to early twentieth century: the contestation of a single, globalized, international system. As Cemil Aydin has shown, non-Western elites' encounter with European exceptionalist narratives and the racial barriers that circumscribed the West's application and understanding of Enlightenment ideals crucially delegitimized the Eurocentric world order.[159] Long before the post-1945 anticolonial moment, this impelled Asian intellectuals to construct a more inclusive concept of global civilization, including an alternative discourse of race, which formed the ballast of many anticolonial nationalist projects. Today's global moment of retreat into national units bears echoes of the prior moment's Asian globalization and proliferation of the nation-state form, but is also distant from its predecessor.

Experimentation with racial internationalisms and transnationalisms attended the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century rise of the nation-state as *the* legitimate political form in Southeast Asia. The global advance of Western imperialism had racialized the international sphere, giving succor to social Darwinist theories that arrayed the world into racial camps, making forms of regional federalism seem necessary and natural to constituent Asian nation-states' existence. Asian intellectuals drew on Peter Kropotkin's emphasis on "mutual help" among members of a species as crucial to survival in nature. For Asian intellectuals who had internalized social Darwinism as an explanation of the difference among nations, rather than of the inequality existing in a single nation as it was originally theorized in Europe, Kropotkin's argument bridged social Darwinism and Pan-Asianism. Many turn of the century Filipino revolutionaries grounded anticolonial political legitimacy in "inalienable" understandings of place and nation, but, like their Vietnamese contemporaries, fortified such national groundings within wider racial camps assumed to share various interests—if not civilizational destinies. Aung San in Burma and Sukarno in Indonesia would also later predicate their Asianist regionalism on nationalism. This was a kind of dualistic nationalism.

Recent work has explored East-East intellectual and material connections and charted their creation of a more politicized Asia. The Vietnamese scholar-gentry's intellectual globalization in this period involved cooperative, trans-Asian inquiry with members of the "same culture and same race" and Pan-Asianism, which relied on networks in

159 Cemil Aydin, *Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* (New York, 2007), 8.

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Japan and Thailand.[160] Rebecca Karl argued that the Chinese understanding of what it meant to be modern did not draw primarily from Western models, but from confronting the unevenness of global power at the turn of the twentieth century.[161] Indeed, scholars have borne out the ways in which anti-imperial and nationalist movements developed not only through interaction between European colonial centers and their peripheries but also through interaction between peripheries.[162] This insight built on the foundational transnational scholarship on anticolonial nationalism that focused on global connections and transmission of ideas in the crumbling of the Eurocentric order and emergence of what would become the Third World.[163] This shifted focus to East-East, transperiphery, and intra-Global South histories has allowed us to appreciate more clearly the legitimacy crisis of the Eurocentric imperial world order and see the globalization of the nation-state form and attendant proliferation of nationalisms as something other than merely defensive or derivative phenomena, though those aspects were also present. There was positive political imagining and worldmaking underway too.

With regard to the dualistic nature of Asian anticolonial nationalisms, the argument that nationalism and internationalism were existentially entangled in the colonized Asian "periphery" at the turn of the twentieth century should come as no surprise; Christopher Hill interrogated their simultaneous emergence (even entanglement) in the global "centers" of Japan, France, and the United States in the same period.[164] Does Southeast Asian anticolonial dualistic nationalism have something to contribute beyond rearticulations of the contingency of the nation-state? By this I refer to the argument that the nation-state is a contingent historical creation, so we should not teleologically presuppose its formation when we look into the past and should instead keep in view all of the enduring transnational and nonnational alternatives to the nation-state. Yet, in Southeast Asia, transnational racial solidarity ultimately served nationalist movements and aims, rather than vice versa, as Vietnamese and Philippine Pan-Asianism showed from so early on.[165] So does Southeast Asian anticolonial dualistic nationalism actually cut away at the nonteleological argument about the contingency of the nation-state?

Southeast Asia troubles the traditional literature's assumption that multiethnic empires are doomed "prisons of peoples" bound to fall apart. Yet, what Southeast Asia bears out most strikingly is not necessarily a critique of the nation-state teleology or a positive account of the long-term existence of nonnational alternative state forms. Rather, Southeast Asia shows the ways in which imperialism worked a special kind of alchemy that has largely kept together multiethnic imperially constructed states, despite their artificialness.[166] During the independence revolutions, elite leaders insisted that the modern, centralized nation-state be implemented immediately within the imperial borders. Anthony Reid attributes the alchemy to the traditionally state-averse

160 See Lorraine Marion Paterson, "Tenacious Texts" (PhD diss., Yale University, 2006); Christopher E. Goscha, *Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885–1954* (Richmond, 1999).

161 Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World* (Durham, 2002).

162 See Elleke Boehmer, *Empire, the National, and the Postcolonial, 1890–1920* (Oxford, 2002); Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis* (New York, 2015); Noor-Aiman I Khan, *Egyptian-Indian Nationalist Collaboration and the British Empire* (New York, 2015).

163 See Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment* (Oxford, 2007).

164 Christopher L. Hill, *National History and the World of Nations* (Durham, 2008).

165 See Resil B. Mojares, "Los itineraries de Mariano Ponce y el imaginario político filipino," *Filipinas, un país entre dos imperios*, ed. María Dolores Elizalde and Josep M. Delgado (Barcelona, 2011); William J. Duiker, "Phan Boi Chau," *Journal of Asian Studies* 31.1 (1971).

166 Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy* (New York, 2012).

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nature of Southeast Asia, where highlands and far-flung islands long offered escapes from the state, and the nature of turn of the twentieth-century colonial ideologies in which empires extended full sovereignty within their boundaries and assumed the unitary functions of nation-states but without many of their key features (democracy, mass education, equality before the law). Coupled with the upwardly mobile Western-educated creole elite's increasing participation in the economy alongside belittling social and political caps to their advancement, this imperial nation-state form ensured the success of anti-imperial arguments and groomed those creoles simply to replace one ruling group with another, while keeping existing structural borders in place, delaying potential ethnic struggles for nationalist inclusion. With a few exceptions, the nation-state in Southeast Asia was largely an elite or, at best, anticolonial tool. While many aspects of this formula were obtained elsewhere in the decolonizing world, the striking feature in Southeast Asia is how few attempts there have been to redraw the artificial, multiethnic imperial borders, instead largely taking the imperial constructions as ready givens for authentic postcolonial nation-states. This imperial genesis and continuity of the Southeast Asian nation-states is one key to understanding its nationalisms' limits.

Another key is Southeast Asian dualistic nationalism, which was the fruit of the region's racialized geopolitical competition, when the unit of the nation-state seemed insufficient to address an international reality of material inequality ordered along racial lines. For the colonized, no strategy could afford to be purely transnational, given the immediate reality of local, everyday oppression, and this distinction is crucial to understanding the Pan-Asianism of the colonized Southeast Asian "periphery" as distinct from that of the Northeast Asian "center." Yet, any such victory within a narrowly national frame would always remain tenuous and incomplete, as Adom Getachew has also noted of the postwar postcolonial period.[167] Emancipation was racial and international, making anticolonialism transnational. The entangled goals of Asian anticolonial nationalisms therefore trafficked necessarily in both nation and race and were both national and transnational. Further, beyond the negative victory of emancipation, race and racial transnationalisms also served positive roles.

First, race served a positive function in the anticolonial argumentation for and construction of nations, particularly in the colonized "periphery" of Asia. In the Philippines, the visible lack of ancient kingdoms/ruins around which to assemble and specify a nation made claims to civilization and historical grandeur through a blanket concept of race seem necessary.[168] Anticolonial nationalisms formed in the interstices of the colonized and colonizer's imaginaries. It is no surprise then that while often arguing against or "subverting" the Western epistemologies arrayed against them, the colonized also integrated those epistemologies into their anticolonial nationalism.[169] This is not unlike Richard Drayton's discussion of colonial nationalism as "forced

167 Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*.

168 Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation* (New York, 2020).

169 Megan C. Thomas, *Orientalists, Propagandists, and Ilustrados* (Minneapolis, 2012).

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poetics" in his contribution to this forum. European Orientalism's statements of difference between East and West obtained not only as intellectual planks supporting Western imperialism and racism but also positively as the foundations for Asia's unique role within a shared, universal history of civilization. "Peripheral" Filipino Asianists advanced a unitary concept of civilization, housed alternately in the East and West, indifferent to where it landed. They then claimed a place in this universal history through a geographic construction of the Asian race that generalized an ancient Chinese grandeur (recognizable even to Europeans) and made it racially available to their nationalism. This agnostic, historicized concept of universal civilization also allowed Filipino Asianists to reconcile (and diminish) the history of the rise and fall of great powers and the current state of material inequality between East and West.[170] The Filipino Asianists' construction of Asia through an agnostic universal civilization is similar to that of Japanese Pan-Asianist Kaneko Yahei, which was more daring in its depreciation of Europe's early benighted state and Asia's historical role in civilizing Europe.[171]

Secondly, Pan-Asianism and the example of Meiji Japan, through their assertion of the unique fruits of Asian culture and proof of successful "Asian" modernization, supported the legitimacy and perceived viability of Asian nationalists' claims of rightful sovereignty over their countries *in spite of* their countries' relative "failure" in a social Darwinist geopolitical competition. The content of the Pan-Asian imaginary and proposition in the colonized periphery did not merely amount to a new strategy within the same social Darwinist struggle, however. The peripheral Pan-Asianists asserted that the "Asia" within Pan-Asia would embody a rightful moral grounding to geopolitics, which they judged as lacking in the international sphere and asserted was Asia's unique offering. This pitted a materialist West against a spiritual East. Within this framework, peripheral Pan-Asianists were often ambivalent about the imperial potential embedded in Asianist alliance, highlighting instead its new vision of diplomacy.

Such early twentieth-century Asianist thinking revived toward the same century's end in reaction to the heavy-handed modernization theory impositions of the 1960s and 1970s and alongside the "Asian miracles" of the 1960s to the 1990s. Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir Mohamad, and the People's Republic of China propounded (and instrumentalized) "Asian values," which admonished the West's excessive individualism and transtemporalized Asia to claim an embedded modernity such that "deviance" from the unilinear path of Western modernity was something other than a backward slide. What had been gained in the interim between the anticolonial and postcolonial Asianist nationalisms was an eating away of Manichean dichotomies of East and West, even as a dialectical relationship continued to undergird them. Meanwhile, in the fallout of the end of history debate, pundit prophets heralded the coming

170 CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*.

171 For further discussion, see Vladimir Tikhonov, "Korea's First Encounters with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s," *Review of Korean Studies* 5.2 (2002).

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"Asian century," and spiritualist/collectivist Asia's differing prescriptions for world order returned to bookshelves, but with a more inclusive world stage.[172] Asia no longer proffers its future to Asia alone. More rigorous versions of this conversation obtained in the academy, where scholars such as Prasenjit Duara and Kuan-Hsing Chen removed Asianist Asia's narrow racial remit, historicized and interrogated it as a coherent region, and took seriously its potential epistemological and methodological offerings.[173] Indeed, the global turn in history produced a sophisticated debate on alternative/multiple modernities, which despite productive scholarly debate was ultimately bedeviled by the failure to conclusively define modernity itself.[174]

A century of Asianist thinking has done the most work to our understandings of modernity and civilization while seemingly removing race itself as an urgent category of analysis within Asian nationalisms. We have benefited from the past decade's generative studies of Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Africanism, and, to a lesser degree, Pan-Malayism and Pan-Pacificism, as well as of the creation of the Third World and Global South. Yet besides a broad narrative implying the transition of scale and affinity between various transnational solidarities, we do not yet have a global intellectual historical argument bearing out this twentieth-century evolution. After World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution and Wilsonian principles undercut the appeal of Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism. After World War II, the suffering caused by Japanese occupation and local exigencies of decolonization disenchanted Asia with the idea of Japanese-led Pan-Asianism. But precisely how did the paradigm shifts of the twentieth century refract the moving targets of "Asia" and race, and how did those refractions affect their salience? If race has receded as a category within Southeast Asian nationalisms, what does that imply about the presence of the global within past and current nationalisms, once so vitally bound to contestations of the imperial international order? Race once crucially informed worldmaking and helped explain away the ledger in a social Darwinist geopolitical competition, supporting Southeast Asian dualistic nationalism. Today, race appears relevant in the region's nationalisms only as an anticolonial artifact or for subterranean anti-imperial potential.

Yet, Southeast Asian nation-states themselves are imperial artifacts. Empire was nationalism's sponsor and landscape in Southeast Asia. The occupying Japanese supported the development of vernacular news publishing in Indonesia and the British colonizers created templates for minority inclusion and representation in Burmese political institutions, for example. Further still, the nation-states created out of the Southeast Asian imperial landscape are, in certain respects, empires dressed up in new nation-state garb. This insight can support Sebastian Conrad's effacing of the split genealogical sequence for the Global North and Global South regarding the order of creation of empires and nations as well as Aydin's narrative of nationalism as an elite, imperial strategy for post-imperial Ottoman survival. Decolonization left imperial border

172 See Kishore Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere* (New York, 2008); Parag Khanna, *The Future Is Asian* (New York, 2019).

173 Prasenjit Duara, "Asia Redux," *Journal of Asian Studies* 69.4 (2010); Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method* (Durham, 2010).

174 See Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens Riedel, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, eds., *Reflections on Multiple Modernities* (Leiden, 2002); Partha Chatterjee, *Lineages of Postcolonial Society* (New York, 2011).

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lines largely undisturbed in Southeast Asia and creole elites took over the colonial elite's roles, promising to more fully execute the unitary functions of the modern, centralizing imperial nation-states than did their predecessors. Ethnic inclusion continues to be as important an issue under the nation as it was under the empire, and Southeast Asia is not alone in Asia in this experience. China continues to perform its nationalism within an empire at the expense of many subnational communities. Relatedly, Lydia Walker in this forum has discussed the limits of African decolonization in the context of international institutions' failure to recognize minority nationalisms.

In addition to keeping clear the continuing historical role of empire in Southeast Asian nationalisms, we should not lose sight of the nonnational side to nationalism's political imagination in the region. To do so is to lose sight of the ways in which, from the very beginning, the unit of the nation-state was seen as insufficient to address the international reality of material inequality ordered along racial lines. By the same token, we cannot discount the importance of the national landscape within the transnational political alternatives to the nation-state, such as Pan-Asianism. To do so will occlude the experience of the colonized "periphery" participating in such racialized worldmaking and political experiments. They could not afford to think only transnationally, given their local, everyday struggles, and nationalism was their best strategic option on that scale (and eventually their only real one). In this, the colonized Asian periphery's political imagining not only internalized European orientalist epistemologies, but also employed constructions of race and of "Asia" founded on those epistemologies toward positive political ends.

Richard Drayton

The Poetics of Anticolonial Nationalism

How should we understand anticolonial nationalism? This problem has always been entangled with the larger question of the meaning of nations and nationalism everywhere, and in particular, because of the Eurocentricity of the social sciences, with how the West has understood its own political history. Interpretations of extra-European nationalism have often provided a theater in which European debates have been rehearsed.[175] Since around 1980 social constructionist views of nationalism have been predominant, seeing it as principally artificial, as invented tradition, a fictive relationship of ethnicity to culture to territory to political destiny propagated by manipulative elites who are

175 See Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London, 1964), and *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983), and Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 1990).

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the beneficiaries of imagined communities and the nation-state. Anticolonial nationalism in the early and mid-twentieth century, particularly when married to a project of state-making, has in this vein been treated as a "derivative discourse," or as a late (and unfortunate) abandonment of a federal exit from imperial domination, which is imagined to have promised better outcomes than political independence delivered.[176]

The progenitors of this skeptical view were rarely as candid as Eric Hobsbawm, who confessed to "disliking, distrusting, disapproving and fearing nationalism wherever it exists."[177] But this historiographical wave had its origins in disaffection with aspects of the postcolonial nation-state, during and after the long 1970s. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson's attack on primordial explanations of nationalism, had its provenance in his disquiet with the Indonesian state's human rights atrocities after 1965, and its coercive relationship to its ethnic minorities in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Timor. Meanwhile Partha Chatterjee's assault on the Nehruvian state-making project in India had crystallized in the crucible of the authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi's Emergency of 1975.[178] At least since Frantz Fanon's essay "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness" (1961), there had also been an internal Pan-African critique of nationalism and elite state-making, which was joined to later concern about how the political boundaries imposed on Africa by the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 had engendered enduring violence, not least in the Congo Basin.[179] In the Caribbean, the Left shone a hard light onto the "politics of constitutional decolonization" and the persistence under new flags of colonial economic, cultural, and spiritual regimes.[180]

The late twentieth-century turn to artificial interpretations of anticolonial nationalism came from those who viewed the vertical solidarities of nationalism as used against social class solidarity, and as the basis of the social domination of privileged, coercive, and sometimes corrupt elites. But it should be noted that this new current from the Left was also compatible with the latest conservative interests. This rise of historiographical skepticism toward nationalism in the 1970s coincided with the attacks from the right on the legitimacy of the Keynesian and the socialist developmental state, and on the claims of Third World states to a new international economic and political order. By the 1990s, these led to the attack on the principle of national sovereignty in doctrines of "humanitarian intervention" and of the "responsibility to protect." Left and Right liberals met often about "human rights," which now meant individual freedoms as opposed to collective social and economic rights, and which returned the Global North to a legitimate domination of the postcolonial international system.[181] The secret sharers of the analysis of Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Fred Cooper were those who through the Washington consensus and "structural adjustment" sought to limit the postcolonial state's power to intervene in its economy and social welfare, and those who sought to legitimize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's intervention in Yugoslavia and the Iraq and Libyan wars

176 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*; Cooper, *Citizenship between Nation and Empire* (2014). For my view on the fashionable idea that federations between metropolis and colony were a viable alternative to political independence see Drayton, "Federal Utopias and the Realities of Imperial Power," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 37.2 (2017).

177 Eric Hobsbawm, *On Nationalism* (London, 2021).

178 For more recent negotiations of these anxieties see Veronika Kusumaryati's discussion of the Java-centered nationalism of the Indonesian state in her article "Nationalism," *Indonesia* 109 (2020).

179 See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton, 1996), with its argument about the "decentralized despotism" of the colonial order and its political legacies.

180 Trevor Munroe, *The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization* (Kingston, 1973); Rupert Lewis, "The Jamaican Left," *Small Axe* 23.1 (2019).

181 See Jessica Whyte, *The Morals of the Market* (London, 2019); Slobodian, *Globalists*.

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via the doctrine of "contingent sovereignty."[182] The critics of the gatekeeper state thus marched, in practice, if not wittingly, in step with those who wished to take down the gates.

It is usually forgotten that these kinds of arguments about the fraudulence of nationalism first emerged on the right of European politics. From Klemens von Metternich's attempt with the Carlsbad Decrees to force the nationalist genie back into its bottle, to the reactionary Catholic and monarchist regionalist response of figures such as Charles Maurras to the Third Republic in France, the proposition was made that nationalism was artificial, a subversive project of sinister minorities. Colonial powers, similarly, had viewed anticolonial crowds as mobs fomented by agitators, Islamic or Bolshevik equivalents of the Carbonari, and not as the expressions of an ascendant bottom-up modern politics of an Indian, Egyptian, or Trinidadian nation. Among heirs to this view was the so-called Cambridge School of Indian History of the 1960s and 1970s, with its Namierite interpretations of Indian nationalism as a performative negotiation with British power.[183] Antinationalism can sometimes also be a derivative discourse.

The most powerful riposte to hard versions of the constructionist view of anticolonial nationalism came in Christopher Bayly's *Origins of Nationality in South Asia*. His motivations were complex, but one may discern a kind of Western liberal sympathy for the more benign ambitions of Jawaharlal Nehru and his heirs, and a will to dissent from both the Cambridge school and the Subalternists. It is curious, given Bayly's extraordinary prestige as a global historian, in particular after the success of *The Birth of the Modern World* (2004), how little influence these essays had outside of South Asian history. Bayly offered three penetrating replies to "artificial" interpretations of nationality. First, he showed how old precolonial forms of patriotism had arisen from the experience of place, praise songs of mountain, forest, and water, joined to celebrations of cultural community. Second, he argued that these underpinned the emergence in eighteenth-century India of theories of "humoral patriotism" which linked the embodied political subject with the territory they inhabited, resembling the contemporary claims of Whig politics of England, Montesquieu's assertion that government might be based on climate, and the creole patriotisms of Spanish America. Third, and most importantly, he argued that Indians were not passive recipients of European political tutelage, but active ideological actors, entangling imported liberal doctrine with Indian ideologies and putting European ideas to work, in particular as a language of negotiation with the West.[184] Bayly's arguments were anchored in the problem of South Asian politics, but they were manifestly portable. His insistence, in particular, that non-Western thinkers and politicians gave new meanings to European political ideas as they applied them to Indian realities, culture, ideas, and structures of feeling, had clear implications for the meanings of nationalism elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and even perhaps in Europe.

182 Richard Drayton, "Beyond Humanitarian Imperialism," in *The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa*, ed. Bronwen Everill and Josiah Kaplan (London, 2013).

183 Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1968).

184 This argument found its full expression in Christopher Bayly, *Recovering Liberties* (Cambridge, 2011). See also Shruti Kapila, *Violent Fraternity* (Princeton, 2021).

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Bayly's first and second arguments have found echoes in other work which has insisted that forms of nationality in Asia and Africa, connecting ethnicity to territory to state-making projects, had long predated any European influence.[185] Victor Lieberman's monumental *Strange Parallels* presented a comparative and connective history of political society across the ethnonations of Eurasia over a thousand year period from the perspective of Burma and its region.[186] African historians have similarly disputed that ethnoterritorial politics depended on either European ideology or waited for the continent's partition in 1884–85.[187] As Kenneth Harrow noted, "Europeans did not export state formation to Africa, they imposed an administration upon populations already accustomed to being ruled by some state entity, or else cognizant of such entities in the form of neighboring states."[188] Now, to be sure, these forms of ethnopolitical ideology and governmentality were quite different from the forms of nation and nationalism in Asia and Africa that succeeded European intervention. But as for Bayly's Indian patriotisms, recognizing the long lineages of precolonial politics should raise questions for how we understand the twentieth-century Afro-Asian reception of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder or Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin.

Bayly's third argument about the colonized deploying imported ideology for their own aims may be sharpened by thinking about how this gesturing with Western political symbols was forced by the violent interventions of the West. The Caribbean philosopher Édouard Glissant in a 1976 essay distinguished between "free poetics," in which a creative actor is in a position of sovereignty and can choose their own style and registers of meaning freely, and "forced poetics," in which a weaker party is forced to seek its aims via the symbolic system of a dominant one.[189] Those on the underside of power relations are compelled to submerge their ultimate values and aims which become "something impossible to express" in Glissant's terms. Through this lens, we may recognize how, at the climax of European hegemony, people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were compelled to wear European clothes, and to negotiate their literature or politics in European languages and categories. The colonial order represented, in other words, an illocutionary context in which meaning was constrained not, per Quentin Skinner, by past usages, but rather by the pressures of present power on the speech act.[190] Anticolonial nationalism should thus first be understood as a tactical system through which ambitions which were imponderable or unsayable in the prevailing order could be negotiated. That British West Indian nationalists turned to the political language of liberal imperialism and "commonwealth" did not mean that their ultimate strategic goals or Pan-African ambitions were contained in the objectives of Jan Smuts or Alfred Milner.[191] If their contemporary King Vajiravudh created a modern Thai monarchical nationalism based on a Western model, he did so not out of slavishness, but because it was the only way to keep at bay the predatory Western powers.[192]

185 Their parallel is the argument of medieval and early modern European historians that cognates of nationalism may be found long before the modern period. See, for example, Philip Gorski, "The Mosaic Moment," *American Journal of Sociology* 105.5 (2000).

186 Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2003, 2009).

187 Vincent Hiribarren, *A History of Borno* (London, 2017).

188 Kenneth W. Harrow, "Nationalism," *Research in African Literatures* 32.3 (2001): 33.

189 Édouard Glissant, "Free and Forced Poetics," in "Ethnopoetics: A First International Symposium," ed. Michael Benamou and Jerome Rothenberg, special issue, *Alcheringa* 2.2 (1976).

190 Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8.1 (1969).

191 Richard Drayton, "Commonwealth History from Below?," in *Commonwealth History in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Saul Dubow and Richard Drayton (London, 2020).

192 Walter F. Vella and Dorothy B. Vella, *Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism* (Honolulu, 1978).

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Imperial domination was the school of nationalism in colonies, not just in the banal sense of prompting an attempt at self-defense, but in compelling the choice of European registers of political ambition and ideology. When Kwame Nkrumah declared "Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom!," he did so recognizing that, in his context, only through laying claim to nationalism and the sovereign nation could Africans both negotiate full personhood in the international system and unleash the efficiencies of the developmental state. Even around 1946, when the federal exits from empire which interest Cooper were most popular, it was the developmental potential of a global socialist French state that was attractive. We should perhaps start thinking about "nation-statism" as the core of anticolonial nationalism: people in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean wanted states that would build dams, electrify, bring machine industry, and transform public health and education. However, by the 1950s, France, Britain, and Belgium made clear that their welfare state would not extend their blessings to colonial peoples, wages and living standards would not be equalized, and "development" would prioritize the needs of Western investor exporters over local industrialization. In this context, for Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Rueben Um Nyobé, or Lumumba, political independence became a priority. Compromised by colonial legacies, and by repeated postcolonial interventions by the Global North, their new nation-states rarely achieved the social peace and cornucopian abundance they had aimed for. This should not distract us from recognizing that nationalism and state-making were, in practice, the only ideological options on the table, part of the forced political poetics of the twentieth-century moment.

Glenda Sluga

Nationalism as Historical Method

How should we write the history of nationalism? During the 1990s crescendo of nationalism studies, the answers rose on a note of paradox. In 1993, anthropologist Katherine Verdery summed up the situation in her article "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?" Decrying the vast interdisciplinary "scholarly industry" that had built up around the concepts of nation and nationalism to rival "all other contemporary foci of intellectual production," Verdery argued that the end result further reified nationalism as a "social actor."[193]

Since then, the concept "methodological nationalism" has exposed the extent of the predicament facing historians who want to undo nationalism even as they study it. As sociologist Ulrich Beck noted,

193 Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?," *Daedalus* 122.3 (1993).

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methodological nationalism references "a perspective that equates society with national society," obscures any lived reality beyond a national conceptual frame, and "gains its position as the natural way of looking at the world from the fact that it 'adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis.'"[194] Consequently, for Beck and other like-minded social scientists, the epistemological challenge is more complex than the reification of nationalism, or whether we make the nation a "focus of intellectual production." It raises the question, how can we see and grasp the "cosmopolitized social reality" in which we live?[195]

It might take a historian to notice, but once we start to look back with this question in view, it is clear that historians have long acknowledged this methodological predicament. In the 1990s, while working on the history of nationalism in the Adriatic port town of Trieste, I encountered the mid-twentieth-century local historian Fabio Cusin. So exhausted by the nationalist rivalries of his community and its chroniclers, Cusin plowed the sea for metaphors and examples of boundary transgression and transcendence, as forms of what Beck terms *cosmopolitization*. "Our historians," Cusin argued, have been "guided by a misunderstood nationalism that arbitrarily interprets or invents history." He maintained those inventions were composed in the face of contradictory evidence of "the complex, dis-unified history of our city, subject across the centuries to many and diverse influences that cannot be amalgamated into a single synthesized source."[196] Cusin went so far as to question the possibility of writing history based on arbitrary interpretations of ethnically coherent territories and peoples. His own more desperate strategy was to deploy irony and satire (complete with cartoons) as an alternative narrative context determining alternative content. Thus, Trieste became "a city of the world" in which, in earlier ages, local inhabitants consumed pieces of their dead compatriots in order to "acquire something of each other." From this same satirical perspective, he depicted inhabitants of his own time disputing territorial sovereignty in the Adriatic Sea by trying to stop the sea's currents from moving volumes of otherwise sovereign water. Cusin's insistence that history was a process of liberation from a constrained and fixed sense of ethnonational self-identification and of an ethnonational past did not end well for him. He gained a reputation for being a young man who had shown promise, but then developed into a "psychologically unbalanced iconoclast." Cusin's methodological eccentricities, added to his Jewishness, were enough to deny him an academic career.[197]

When we look back armed with the concept of methodological nationalism, Cusin appears less "unbalanced" and more one of a coterie of historians across the twentieth century unpacking the premises of national histories.[198] The end of the Second World War is particularly thick with this population ready to critique nationalism, noting with dissatisfaction the national obsessions of the discipline and even their own work, and casting around for evidence and theories of anti-national or overtly cosmopolitized experiences and politics. By the

194 Sabine Selchow, "Starting Somewhere Different," *Global Networks* 20.3 (2020): 553, 546; Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge, 2006), 48; Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences," *British Journal of Sociology* 57.1 (2006): 4; see also Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond," *Global Networks* 2.4 (2002). I would like to thank Selchow for her helpful conversations in the writing of this piece.

195 See Sabine Selchow, "The Path(s) Not (Yet) Taken," *Security Dialogue* 47.5 (2016): 371; Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, 174. Importantly, in his last book Beck describes this cosmopolitization as distinct from normative cosmopolitanism; it involves "the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of distant others … a kind of imperialistic interconnectedness combining physically the radical unequal worlds." Beck, *The Metamorphosis of the World* (New York, 2016), 74.

196 See my discussion in Glenda Sluga, "Inventing Trieste," *European Legacy* 1.1 (1996).

197 We can compare the tragic fate of the Austrian Welt-Kultur figure Erwin Hanslik, in Glenda Sluga, "'Global Austria' and the League of Nations," in *Remaking Central Europe*, ed. Peter Becker and Natasha Wheatley (New York, 2021).

198 Glenda Sluga and Julia Horne, "Cosmopolitanism: Its Pasts and Practices," *Journal of World History* 21.3 (2010).

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1940s, US historian Carleton Hayes (often cited as a father of the study of nationalism) looked back skeptically on his own earlier work, when he was guilty of accepting nationalism as an unconscious psychological force "akin to love" and comfortably distinctive from the violence of "ultra-patriotism."[199] The mid-twentieth-century Hayes had shifted perspective from this normative view: nationalism was "certainly but one expression of human instinct and not a bit more natural or more 'latent' than tribalism, clannishness, urbanism or imperialism." [200] In this same way, his argument ran, intellectuals who privileged the nation as an object of study contributed to the naturalization of all forms of nationalism, including "ultra-patriotism."

In 1953, as the Cold War exacerbated nationalist inclinations among states, historians concerned to shift the nation-obsessed contours of their discipline looked to the relatively new intergovernmental United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with its own commitment to constructing the defenses of peace in the "minds of men." The UNESCO journal *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale* [*Papers of World History*]—published in French, Spanish, and English, with abstracts in German, Russian, and Arabic—was edited by seventy-five-year-old *Annales* historian Lucien Febvre, who intended it to speak to "all peoples, perhaps of all civilisations," eradicating "ignorance of each other's ways and lives." In Febvre's view, the journal's world scale was one antidote to the nationalist historical narratives that had bolstered total war. For this same reason, Febvre involved himself in UNESCO's grand "mental engineering" project, *History of Mankind*, with its anticipated potential for telling "the history of peaceful relations" in "the image of a moving humanity since its origins, travelling permanently through a perpetual series of transcontinental migrations."[201]

We do not have to agree with expectations that UNESCO's historical perspective would foster "the idea that separations in the world are mere illusions, and that the earth never ceases to diversify, to enrich, to mutually fertilize with streams of peaceful exchanges."[202] The point is not that any of these historical examples transcended the contradictions of their historic moment, or that they evaded the cultural, social, economic, or political premises of methodological nationalism. Writing between 1934 and 1961, Arnold Toynbee's volumes on *The Study of History* hypothesized that "no single nation or national state of Europe can show a history which is in itself self-explanatory." Toynbee's openness to the connectivity of the world's nations and states was inculcated (much as with Hayes) in the novelty of First World War international thinking and the new interwar arena of international government, while advising national governments on their specific interests. Indeed, his worldview presented the connectivity of the world's nations and states from the perspective of the dominance of "Western civilization."[203] In this sense, it was a perspective akin to what Sanjay Subrahmanyam has described as the *Annalistes*' civilizational location of the Mediterranean

199 Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926), 6. See also the discussion of methodological republicanism and even methodological liberalism in Merve Fejzula, "The Cosmopolitan Historiography or Twentieth Century Federalism," *Historical Journal* 64.2 (2021); Michael Goebel, "After Empire Must Come Nation?," *Afro-Asian Visions* (blog), *Medium*, September 8, 2016.

200 Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1948), v, 292.

201 Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the UN," *Journal of World History* 19.3 (2008).

202 "Rapport de M. Lucien Febvre" (May 1949), box 118, Julian Sorell Huxley Papers, Rice University, Houston, TX.

203 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 vols. (Oxford, 1934–61).

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as "above all a sea seen from the north, based on European and often Christian sources and perspectives." As Subrahmanyam explains, Ottomans, the Mughals of India, and the Chinese all lost out in this style of connected world history. Even more disturbing, "awareness of globality" can be historically located as the product of extermination as well as exclusion arising out of the gradual integration of America with Eurasia and Africa.[204]

In the early twenty-first century, the concept of methodological nationalism is emerging as a catchall phrase, creeping into historians' toolboxes of accusation as much as explanation. This might reflect the claims of social scientists who argue that neither in the historical nor in the social sciences are there empirical analyses that are *not* tainted by methodological nationalism. Categories as basic as "*household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory and politics*" are all captured by methodological nationalism.[205] At the same time, there is agreement that study of nations and nationalism does not per se constitute an instance of methodological nationalism. Instead, methodological nationalism is evident (or not) in the conceptual toolkit such studies apply. So it is worth asking, how can historians use the concept of methodological nationalism to break free of its fetters? What should our toolkit be?

Here, too, developments in the social sciences are useful for reflecting on history's own potential. Awareness of methodological nationalism has led to reflection on the prospects for a "methodological cosmopolitanism." This would be the distinct object of empirical research intended to help us see what so many historians in the past have tried to see, namely the existing and changing cosmopolitized world. That said, even for Beck, who is most often associated with this idea, methodological cosmopolitanism is as elusive as it is a necessary discourse and practice; it requires the development of a new language, a new system of social scientific categories that do not take the nation-state as their norm, not least the reconceptualization of basic categories of analysis—including "zombie categories"—"within the framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science." While there are emerging discussions and experiments of empirical research grounded in how methodological cosmopolitanism could and should look, generally speaking, the conceptual language that might take us beyond modern is hardly at hand.[206] Some social scientists argue that we do not need to wait for a fully-fledged methodological cosmopolitan language or grammar. For example, Sabine Selchow has suggested distinguishing between the "long-term" purpose of methodological cosmopolitanism and a more immediate strategy of empirical exploration of "the reality of the 'cosmopolitan outlook,' eventually and in a collective and transdisciplinary endeavour building up to contribute to the former."[207] From this perspective, historians might consider the concept of methodological cosmopolitanism a useful provocation for making

204 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "On the Origins of Global History" (lecture, Collège de France, Paris, November 28, 2013). By contrast, Subrahmanyam finds throughout the Middle Ages, and in the Elizabethan and Mughal eras, examples of a "universal history" that is "capable of integrating … two or more histories, and thus going beyond an egocentric history."

205 Beck and Sznaider, "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism," 6; emphasis in original. See also Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, 73, cited in Selchow, "The Path(s) Not (Yet) Taken," 375.

206 Beck and Sznaider cited in Sabine Selchow, "Starting Somewhere Different," *Global Networks* 20.3 (2020): 553. See also Anders Blok and Sabine Selchow, "Risk Society," in *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory*, ed. Bryan S. Turner et al. (London, 2017).

207 Selchow, "Starting Somewhere Different," 544.

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our scholarly insights about the past a basis for imagining a prosperous and sustainable world for all in the future, much as some of our forebears have done. Indeed, currently, this approach is inspiring all matter of invention in the social sciences to counter the policy implications of methodological nationalism, from postgrowth and post-GDP economic paradigms to planetary thinking. For the historian who wants to follow this path at this juncture of the twenty-first century, with its accumulating existential crises, the debate becomes about how we can and should write history at all.

While there are no easy answers to "what kind of history?" the early twenty-first century is already marked by a turn to new methods of transnational, global, and even international history (specifically the new histories of internationalism), that have echoed mid-twentieth-century ambitions, in new ways and contexts. In her 2007 presidential address to the American Historical Association, Linda Kerber asked, "is it possible still to imagine a citizenship of the world?"[208] In *Writing History in the Global Era*, Lynn Hunt envisioned a "more globally oriented history" encouraging "a sense of international citizenship, of belonging to the world and not just to one's own nationality" and ultimately producing "tolerant and cosmopolitan global citizens."[209] Recent historical interest in "Black Internationalism" might also fit this makeshift genealogy of a methodological cosmopolitanism. Despite "the lack of precision around terminology," it is not a stretch to consider the interchangeable use of "Black Internationalism," "Pan-Africanism," and "diaspora" as capturing a cosmopolitized experience that underscores the limits of methodological nationalism for incorporating the experiences of Black populations, and harvests a rich crop of nonnational, and antinational, as well as national, political thought.[210]

To a significant extent, the historiographical trend of turning away from the nation has made it much easier to see the nationalisms against which rogue historians such as Cusin pitted themselves, or even vocal female historians keen to counter what we now call methodological nationalism. This is not to argue that the obviously diverse methodologies of integrated universal or world history or scalar experimentation are easily assimilable, either in category, period, or motivation. However, we have the tools to locate them in a long history of reprised ambitions, expectations, and imperatives focused on transcending nationalism in the profession, of historians tacitly decrying a discipline unable to disentangle itself from methodological nationalism and embracing the spirit of methodological cosmopolitanism, if not the letter.

In the 1880s, the French philosopher Ernest Renan famously remarked, in answer to the question of the day "what is a nation?" that the authority and realism of national communities relied on forgetting the past as well as reinventing it. In the face of the cosmopolitized challenges specific to our own times, it is worth remembering first the ways in which forgetting has followed the study of nationalism (and

208 Linda Kerber, "The Stateless as the Citizen's Other" (speech delivered at the 121st annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Atlanta, GA, 2007).

209 Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York, 2014); see also Akira Iriye, *Global Community* (2002).

210 Kira Thurman in Bedasse et al., "*AHR* Conversation: Black Internationalism"; see also Sarah Dunstan, *Race, Rights and Reform* (Berkeley, 2021).

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its reinventions), and second the empirical evidence that, in the force and shadow of methodological nationalism, historians have aspired to a methodological cosmopolitanism, and that neither "methodology" is hermetically sealed. Even if the still relatively unarticulated potential of methodological cosmopolitanism seems a long way removed from the problem of methodological nationalism, there is enough of a historical argument for actively remembering and trying to understand how and why both methodological approaches have been characteristic of the profession and its aims in the modern era.

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le monde; *Sozialstaat und Gesellschaft*; *Day to Day Communism*; *Nazism across Borders*; and *Planning in Cold War Europe*.

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